Arts of War - blow deadly smoke to counter silent killing
- Part 2 -

Gitchandra S Oinam *

True economy of force is using the indirect approach to affect a psychological defeat without engaging in actual combat. If the enemy is certain as to your point of aim he has the best possible chance of guarding himself-and blunting your weapon. If, on the other hand, you take a line that threatens alternative objectives, you distract his mind and forces. Rebellions can be made by 2 per cent active in a striking force and 98 per cent passively sympathetic (Lawrence).

Deterrence now means something as a strategic policy only when we are fairly confident that the retaliatory instrument on which it relies will not be called to function at all. In wars throughout history, events have generally proved the pre-hostilities calculations of both sides, victor as well as loser, to have been seriously wrong. The bias toward the offensive creates special problems in any technologically new situation where there is little or no relevant war experience to help one reach a balanced judgment.

We can't think strategically if we start our thought process with individual aircraft, sorties, or weapons or even with the enemy's entire military forces. Instead, we must focus on the totality of our enemy, then on our objectives, and next on what must happen to the enemy before our objectives become his objectives. When all of this is done rigorously, we can begin to think about how we are going to produce the desired effect on the enemy -- the weapons, the delivery systems, and other means we will use.

As strategists and operational artists, we must rid ourselves of the idea that the central feature of war is the clash of military forces. In strategic war, a clash may well take place, but it is not always necessary, should normally be avoided, and is almost always a means to an end and not an end in itself.

If we are going to think strategically, we must think of the enemy as a system composed of numerous sub systems. Thinking of the enemy in terms of a system gives us a much better chance of forcing or inducing him to make our objectives his objectives and doing so with minimum effort and the maximum chance of success.

The team's findings have countered some assumptions of traditional economic theory--which people make rational choices based on their self-interest--by showing that people frequently fail to fully analyse situations where they must make complex judgments. Instead, people often make decisions using rules of thumb rather than rational analysis, and they base those decisions on factors economists traditionally don't consider, such as fairness, past events and aversion to loss.

"Run in packs" and that the balance of selected good and bad practices perfectly predicts the outcome of a conflict. The importance of popular support is confirmed, but the ability to interdict tangible support (such as new personnel, materiel, and financing) is the single best predictor of success.

All too often, the critical importance of military theory either is not well understood or is completely ignored by many officers. A reason for this is their apparent lack of knowledge and understanding of the relationship between theory and practice and the real purpose of military theory.

Many officers are also contemptuous of theory because they overemphasize the importance of technology. Many believe that precision strike weapons can win all future wars. Yet, history has shown that the human dimension of warfare cannot be countered by technology alone. War is essentially an expression of hostile attitudes. Technology cannot overcome the greed, fear, hate, revenge, or other emotions that cause wars.

Never neglect the psychological, cultural, political, and human dimensions of warfare, which is inevitably tragic, inefficient, and uncertain. Be skeptical of systems analysis, computer models, game theories, or doctrines that suggest otherwise.( Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, speech at NDU, 29 Sep 2008 ) Your first act against the enemy shouldn't be a nibble! It should demonstrate determination and have traumatic impact (Sir John Woodward).

Attrition is the essence of warfare, not something to be avoided—and no rule says that attrition must be fairly distributed. A tipping point is a concept drawn from epidemiology, where it describes the moment at which an infectious disease becomes a public health crisis. The idea is that small changes will have little or no effect on a system until a critical mass is reached. Then just one additional small change ''tips'' the system, producing dramatic consequences. The concept has been applied to human behavior to describe everything from the breakout of bestsellers to the spread of buzzwords.

The definition of a Centre of Gravity (CoG ) is the source of power that provides moral or physical strength, freedom of action, or will to act. Thus, the center of gravity is usually seen as the "source of strength". In short, the army considers a "friendly" CoG as that element—a characteristic, capability, or locality—that enables one's own or allied forces to accomplish their objectives. Conversely, an opponent's CoG is that element that prevents friendly forces from accomplishing their objectives.

Every art has its rules and maxims. One must study them- theory facilitates practice. The life time of one man is not long enough to enable him to acquire perfect knowledge and experience. It would further human knowledge if, instead of writing new books, we would apply ourselves to making decent extracts from those that are already in existence.

Then one would hope to avoid wasting his time by reading. Petty geniuses attempt to hold everything; wise men hold fast to the key points. But since the best dispositions become useless if they are not executed, it is essential that the general should be industrious in seeing whether his orders are executed or not. Skepticism is the mother of security.

Napoleon Bonaparte, Emperor of France. Military leader; multi skilled reorganizer of continental European politics and law said "If I always appear prepared, it is because before entering on an undertaking, I have meditated for long and have foreseen what may occur. It is not genius which reveals to me suddenly and secretly what I should do in circumstances unexpected by others; it is thought and preparation." A battle sometimes decides everything; and sometimes the most trifling thing decides the fate of a battle.

Strategy is the art of making use of time and space. Space we can recover; lost time, never. Strategy is the use of the engagement for the purpose of the war. The strategist must therefore define an aim for the entire operational side of the war that will be in accordance with its purpose. The campaign plan and strategy must be adapted to the character of the people encountered. The aim will determine the series of actions intended to achieve it.

The original means of strategy is victory -- that is, tactical success; its ends are those objects which will lead directly to peace. Moral makes up three quarters of the game, the relative balance of manpower accounts for only the remaining quarter. Fumbling, the middle course, lose all in war. Nothing is more important in war than unity in command.

Twenty-Eight Articles--Fundamentals of Company by Kilcullen, in Military Review, May-June 2006; many apply to higher levels as well are

1. Know your turf.
2. Diagnose the problem;
3. Organize for intelligence
4. Organize for interagency operations.
5. Travel light and harden your combat service support (CSS).
6. Find a political/cultural adviser.
7.Train the squad leaders—then trust them.
8. Rank is nothing; talent is everything.
9. Have a game plan
10. Be there.
11. Avoid knee-jerk responses to first impressions.
12. Prepare for handover from day one.
13. Build trusted networks.
14. Start easy
15. Seek early victories.
16. Practice deterrent patrol¬ling
17. Be prepared for setbacks.
18. Remember the global audi¬ence.
19. Engage the women, beware of.
20. Take stock regularly
21.Exploit a "single narra¬tive."
22. Local forces should mirror the enemy.
23. Practice armed civil affairs.
24. Small is beautiful
25. Fight the enemy's strategy, not his forces.
26. Build your own solution—only attack the enemy when he gets in the way.
27. Keep your extraction plan secret. And
28. Whatever else you do, keep the initiative.

Concluded .....

Warning: This is only refined general concept of war craft. All technical and tactics are omitted in the write up to avoid imitation and wrong practices. It requires a lot of research works and technical skills for practical application. This essay is writing after release of "Chainarol" ancient Meitei way of warrior.