Three months of Provisional INA Government in Manipur and contributions of local population
- Part 1 -

Laiphrakpam Nishikanta Singh *

Pre War Situation of Manipur:

On Sunday 10th May 1942, Imphal was bombed by Japanese aircraft and Manipur became involved in World War-II. The second bombing was on Saturday the 16th of May 1942. In 1942, the Japanese Army had driven the British, Indian, and Chinese troops out of Burma. British and Indian troops had occupied Imphal. However, the Japanese dropped the idea of further advance due to difficult terrain and supply considerations. The Japanese commander in Burma, Lieutenant General Shojiro Iida, felt that it would be unwise to continue the advance, right into India even after the rains. Thus further advance was paused. Let us examine the situation in Manipur post the aerial bombing.

There were chaos and a pandemonium nearing anarchy. The panic-stricken population started fleeing from the capital to remote areas. Even, the State Durbar (Assembly) shifted to Kwakeithel. All these resulted in an uncontrolled price rise. Essential items were brought from Silchar mostly on foot. Besides, 2 lakh refugees fled the Japanese occupation of Burma. The Allies, especially the British began concentrating troops in Imphal, basically to use it as a forward base for the battles in Burma, to give a battle against the Japanese onslaught, or even use it as a launching pad for a counteroffensive. Thus the depopulation of Imphal was liked by the British. General Slim also eventually quartered in Imphal.

Being a princely state, no political activities were allowed in Manipur. Even the Congress party was not allowed to function and Gandhiji was prevented from entering Manipur. Nikhil Hindu Manipuri Mahasabha was the only proactive political party functioning at that time.

The Arrival of the Indian National Army & Activities of Nikhil Manipuri Mahasabha

Netaji sought the assistance of the people of Manipur. He sent a message asking the people of Manipur to help the INA and Japanese Army who had crossed into Manipur. This message from INA camp at Chamol was brought by a person named Lungdim and handed over to Dr. Gulapchan Singh, who was the then medical officer at Sugnu. It was then given to ThokchomAngou Singh of Singjamei, Imphal of Nikhil Hindu Manipuri Mahasabha. They had similar ideas for independence and welcomed the appeal of Netaji.

Accordingly, two members of the Mahasabha, LaishramJogeshor Singh, and HawaibamRanbir Singh went to Jiribam and organized a meeting in the house of MeitramKanglenjao. A resolution was passed for receiving the INA and Japanese as liberators on the condition that Manipur is declared independent from the British and be recognized as a liberated part of the Indian subcontinent. Accordingly, one member, K. Kunjabihari Singh was tasked to establish secret contact with Japanese monks in the Mahabali forest, right in the heart of Imphal.

Eventually, some leaders of Mahasabha and the PrajaSammelani (a newly floated party led by Irabot) joined INA on their arrival in Manipur. These included ThokchomAngou Singh, PotsangbamTomal Singh, LiashramKanhai Singh, LongjamBijoy Singh, KiyamGopal Singh, Mairembam Koireng Singh, HemamNilamani Singh, LaiphrakpamSanamba Singh, and LaishramGuna Singh. Most of them led a unique lifestyle wearing khadi dresses etc.

In mid-1942, L. Jogeshor Singh was arrested for transmitting information about Kumbhirgram airport to the Japanese. Meanwhile, the State Police began rounding up the members of the Nikhil Hindu Manipuri Mahasabha. Many fled to Burma and joined the INA. Eventually, all those Manipuris who fled to Burma accompanied the INA back to Manipur. The local INA members and sympathizers were under surveillance by the military. Many were arrested and lodged in the Langthabal Military jail which virtually turned into an interrogation center. The inmates were brutally tortured. MaisnamGopal Singh of Lamshang and Angou Singh of Lamlong (Khurai) were inhumanely tortured and released when they were about to die and died soon after their release.

The Aim, Planning, and Preparations for Attack on Imphal

When Japan joined the war, there was no plan to extend it to Indian soil. But seeing the momentum of success and inability of the Allies to check the Japanese onslaught and also based on the intelligence reports that the British forces in Manipur and Chittagong were unprepared, Japan started considering the capture of these two towns. It was appreciated that the capture of Imphal would rob the British of a suitable base for a counteroffensive in Burma, which was already with Japan. It resulted in the aerial attack on Imphal on 10 May 1942, as already brought out above. But this was not followed up because of Japanese inhibitions of stretching too far especially the logistic system.

Meanwhile, the Allies exploited the Japanese indecisiveness. They prepared and strengthened operation and logistic capability to hold Imphal and also support the operations in Burma. During 1942-43, the Allies improved the lines of communication to Assam. Many logistically important airstrips were laid in Manipur and its neighbouring areas. Imphal-Kohima-Dimapur road was substantially improved, the rudimentary Silchar-Imphal road was also repaired and a road from Imphal to Tiddim was also constructed. The United States Army, with Indian labourers, also constructed several airbases in Assam for flying supplies to China. This air route, which crossed several mountain ranges, was known as the Hump. The Americans also began constructing the Ledo road, to connect Assam with China.

In July 1943, NetajiSubhash Chandra Bose arrived in Singapore. Netaji passionately insisted on the capture of Imphal or Chittagong or both, at the earliest, when the Allied forces were least expecting it. Netaji appreciated capture of these could trigger an Indian revolution. He planned that once Imphal is liberated, he would install on the Indian soil an effective Provisional Government of Azad Hind. This would bring more Indians to join the anti-British revolt. On 21st October 1943, the Provisional Government of the Azada Hind was formed under NetajiSubhash Chandra Bose. On 23rd October, Netaji declared war on Britain and the USA.

The above insistence of Netaji, along with the fact that the Allies could anytime be launching a counteroffensive into Burma, prompted the Japanese Military Strategist to decide on a pre-emptive offensive on India both trigger an Indian revolution and also blunt a British counteroffensive. Further Japanese 15th Army Commander, Lt General Mutaguchi, felt that the capture of Imphal could be exploited by advancing to the Brahmaputra River valley which will cut the Allied supply lines to their front in northern Burma and China.

Netaji also discussed the nuances of cooperation between the Japanese and the INA forces with General Kawabe, Commander-in-Chief of the Burma Area Army. He insisted that both should enjoy equal status in all respects. They also agreed that the territories liberated on the Indian soil must be handed over to Major-General AC Chatterjee, Governor-designate of the liberated areas.

Unfortunately, the Japanese High Command at Tokyo took a too long time to make a final decision. This delay gave more time to the British forces to prepare. The Japanese decision taken on 12th August 1943, was revealed to Netaji only on 26th August. Further, the order for the offensive on Imphal was issued only on 10th January 1944 from Tokyo. The commencement of the operations was further delayed due to late in the arrival of the 15 Japanese Division from Siam. Ultimately on 10th February General Kawabe issued the final orders to the 15th Army commanded by Lt. Gen. Mutaguchi with a rider that the campaign be completed within a month because thereafter monsoon was to commence.

Meanwhile, the Allies were also preparing for going on the offensive themselves in early 1944. The Indian 15 Corps was advancing in the coastal Arakan Province, while the British 4 Corps had deployed two Indian infantry divisions almost to the Chindwin River at Tamu and Tiddim. These two divisions were widely separated and vulnerable to being isolated.

The Imphal offensive, Operation ‘U -Go’, as it was called, was to be launched in March 1944. It was an infantry-based operation but Moltke’s theory of operational art was applied. The basic concept of operation was two division-size forces advance from East and Southern axes while one divisional size force goes further north and cuts of the British main artery of Imphal-Dimapur line of communication at Kohima and exploit up to Dimapur railhead. This main attack was to be preceded by a diversionary attack in the Arakan, codenamed ‘Ha-Go’, in the first week of February. This was to draw in the Allied reserves from Assam and also create the impression that the Japanese intended to attack Bengal through Chittagong. Allocation force and task are as given below:-

1. 33rd Infantry Division under Lt General Yanagida to attack Imphal from the South.
2. 15th Infantry Division under Lieutenant-General Yamauchi attack Imphal from the North.
3. Yamamoto Force, formed from units detached from the 33rd and 15th Divisions under Major-General Yamamoto, supported by tanks and heavy artillery, attack Imphal from the East.
4. A separate subsidiary operation, the 31st Infantry Division under Lieutenant-General Sato to isolate Imphal by capturing Kohima, exploit to the Allied supply base at Dimapur railhead.

Japanese generals had some reservations about the battle-worthiness of the INA forces. But they finally agreed to the participation of INA in these operations as Netaji insisted that the battles of Imphal and Kohima would represent the crucial battles for the liberation of India and therefore that, not only the INA should spearhead the attack, but the first drop of bloodshed should be that of an INA soldier. Altogether some 8,800 INA combatants took part in the offensive. The INA formations which participated are given below:-

1. 1st INA Division (Gandhi Brigade) under Maj. General Md. ZamanKiyani along Tamu-Pallel axis
2. 2nd INA Division (Subhas Brigade) under Maj. General Shah Nawaz Khan along Ukhrul.
3. Special Task Force (Intelligence Group) commanded by Colonel S.A. Malik along Tiddim-Moirang
4. The Azad Brigade commanded by Colonel Gulzara Singh, at Tamu-Pallel sector.

British Forces

The 14th Army under Lieutenant General Slim was overall responsible for the Burma campaign. 4 Corps, commanded by Lieutenant General GeoffryScoones was at Imphal. Disposition of formations are given below:-

1. 20th Indian Infantry Division under Major-General Gracey was at Tamu.
2. 17th Indian Infantry Division under Major-General ‘Punch’ Cowan was at Tiddim, the division had two brigades only.
3. 23rd Indian Infantry Division under Major-General Roberts in reserve was in and around Imphal.
4. 50th Indian Parachute Brigade under Brigadier Maxwell Hope-Thompson was north of Imphal, undergoing jungle training.
5. 254th Indian Tank Brigade under Brigadier R. L. Scoones was in and around Imphal.

Initial Battles

The Indo-Japanese troops crossed the River Chindwin on 8 March. But Scoones gave his forward divisions orders to withdraw to Imphal only on 13 March. The 15th Japanese Division of Lt. General Yamauchi moved towards Tamu and Ukhrul in two columns and captured Ukhrul. They advanced towards the Imphal-Dimapur road for their onward attack on Imphal from the northwest. 20th Indian Division at Tamu fell back to Pallel without difficulty because two battalions of Yamamoto Force were delayed in northern Burma.

The 1st INA Division under Major General M.Z. Kiyani also joined the Imphal campaign and fought with the Yammoto force at the Pallel sector. Simultaneously, the 31st Japanese Division commanded by Lt. General Sato advanced to Kohima through Homalin and Jessami. Meanwhile, Major General Shah Nawaz Khan’s 2nd INA Division reached Ukhrul.

Lt. General Yanagida’s 33rd Division moved from the South along Tiddim Road. The Indo-Japanese columns advanced very fast with heavy guns and tanks. 17th British Division could not resist. On the Japanese left flank, the INA’s Subhas Brigade, led by Shah Nawaz Khan, reached the edge of the Chin Hills below Tiddim and Fort White at the end of March. From this position, the 2nd Battalion of INA sent troops to relieve Japanese forces at Falam and Hakha, from where they sent out patrols and laid ambushes for the Chin guerrillas operating under the British and took some prisoners.

During the early part of the offensive, the Bahadur Group was successful in inducing British Indian soldiers to desert. A force under Khan’s Adjutant, Mahboob “Boobie” Ahmed, attacked and captured the hilltop fortress of KlangKlang. The 3rd Battalion of INA meanwhile moved to the Fort White-Tongzang area. The Allied forces retreated vacating the entire area right up to Potshangbam due to the pressure of the advancing Indo-Japanese columns. On 11 April 1944, the British withdrew to Phubala and Ningthoukhong as the 17th British Division occupied defences at general area Bishnupur.

On 13 April, when the British vacated from their positions at Moirang to Potsangbam, there was jubilation among the local people of Moirang as they knew that INA forces will be arriving soon. Some leaders including M. Koireng Singh spent a sleepless night on the 13 April, hiding under the MoirangLamkhai Bridge and watching out eagerly the British 17th Division retreating from Tronglaobi. The following day, the Indo and Japanese forces reached Tronglaobi and occupied the British camp. L. Sanaba Singh, M. Koireng Singh, and K. Kangken Singh went to Tronglaobi and welcomed the INA forces and invited them for the formal flag-hoisting on the mainland Indian soil on the 14th April 1944 at MoirangKangla (the ancient seat of power).

To be continued....


(This article is written for incorporating it as chapter in the forthcoming book on Manipur and Second World War )