A case study of MNF movement for independence in Mizoram
Counter-Insurgency Operation and Human Right Violation
- Part 4 -
Dr Th Siamkhum *
Mizo National Front Emblem:: Pix - Wikipedia/
The contention of the Government of India about airdropping of ration was, indeed, a fabricated version of the incident, because fighter jet was never used to airdrop food and ration anywhere in the history of the world. The question, rather, is "Was the use of air power absolutely unavoidable? Had there been absolutely no option? The problem with resorting to airpower in any counter-insurgency operation is identification of target from the air. Same was the case of airstrike in Mizoram. It caused equal destructions to both MNF fighters and loyal citizens, and forced many loyal citizens to join the rank and file of the MNF. Moreover, the use of air power on one's own people produced negative impact on the peoples' feeling about India and Indians. Hatred against everything India was growing in Mizoram following the airstrikes.
In his book 'Untold Atrocity'C. Zama, a former MNA fighter said the army wielded almost unlimited power during counter insurgency operation in Mizoram. A non-commission Officer (Havildar) had more power than a Deputy Commissioner. If a soldier shot dead someone, he can simply say the person was an MNF supporter, and that was justification enough or if he raped someone, he just say, she is an MNF supporter and nobody could denies. There was no right or wrong in the eyes of the army. What the army said, right was right and what they said, wrong was wronged. "In those days, being a Mizo itself was a crime, as all Mizos, irrespective of loyalty was a suspect" said VL Hluna.
PuZamawia, a Commander of MNF volunteer force in March, 1966 says "The bombings were followed by large scale entry of Indian Troops into Lushai Hills. They ordered evacuation of hundreds of villages after which they burnt down. The villagers were resettled in new areas. Thousands were arrested arbitrarily and unspeakable atrocities committed by them. C. Zama in his book on Mizo Insurgency mentioned that he saw the bombing since he was in the MNA and was fighting in Aizawl. He said, no such thing has happened anywhere in the country. Denghnuna, who also fled Aizawl on March 4, also witnessed the bombing. He was further quoted saying, "The Union Home Minister had said, India wanted to crush the Mizos and hence excessive force was used and civilian population punished; and we don't want the people, what we wanted was the land".
The basic principle followed by many countries is that one cannot resort to airstrike in one's own territory against one's own people. Airstrike against one's own people is belief to have adverse impact on the situation as it naturally further alienated the people on whom it was used and more and more people were forced to join the rank and file of the insurgents. True was the case with the Mizos on whom IAF conducted relentless bombing. More and more people began to join the MNF as a result of airstrikes.
Airstrikes in Mizoram are debatable indeed. While they succeeded in pushing back the guerillas, it left deep scars and probably further invigorate their will to fight for 20 long years. B. Raman, a former head of India's Research and Analysis Wing writers, "Airstrike on one's own nationals tend to aggravate an insurgency situation by causing casualties of civilians and driving more people to join the ranks of insurgents"
It is not that states are restricted from using air power in counter-insurgency operation. Planes could be deployed for surveillance, supply of man and materials, but to use air power for bombing and striking mission is not advisable as it is bound to escalate the situation further. Moreover, to go for air power on those who have no air power is rather a sign of weakness. The wound inflicted on the Mizosduring counter-insurgency operations, the excessive use of force and the untold suffering of the people is yet to be healed. Nothing has yet been done for the emotional rehabilitation of the Mizos. Prime Minister Man Mohan Singh has tendered his apology for operation Blue Star, but no word of apology has yet been offered to the Mizos who suffered much more in the hands of Indian Security Forces, even to the extent of using air power.
VL Hluna narrates, "on the night of February 28, MNF rebels attacked the district treasury at Aizawl and camps of Police and Security Forces at Lunglei and Champ-hai. These two places were captured by the MNF. The rebels attacked the Assam Rifles Battalion Headquarters at Aizawl and the Assam Rifles petrol was ambushed at Chanmari area of Aizawl on the night of March 3 in which 5 jawans were killed. And then, the bombing started on March 5 & 6. We fled Aizawl on March 4 and took shelter at Zokhawsang Village, five km from Aizawl. I saw the fighter planes flying at about 10am on March 5 and bombing Aizawl.
The fighters made about 8 sorties that day and many more sorties, the next day. From Zokhawsang, we heard huge explosion and saw huge flumes of smoke rising. We know, Aizawl was being destroyed. The feeling was terrible and we were paralysed by fear and shock." Many government installations were destroyed including circuit house. Apart from Aizawl, the IAF jet fighters bombed Khawzawl on March 6, Hnahlan on 7, Sangau on 8, Tlabung on 9, Pukpui on 13, Bunghmun on 23, Mualthuam and Tuipui on September 6 and Hmunthang on January 21, 1967.
Immediately after the MNF declared independence and overrun all major military and police installations in the District, the Government of Assam declared the whole District as a "Disturbed" Area under the Assam Disturbed Area Act, 1955 and the Extra-Ordinary Gazette Notification published on 6th March, 1996 declared the MNF as an unlawful organization. Though, martial law was not officially declared, the army was given an unrestrained power to deal with the MNF and its supporters by promulgating the most dreaded legal weapon of Armed Forces Special Power Act, 1958 and by Rule 32 of Defence of India Act, 1962.
A part from these, with the aim to give a free hand to deal with the MNF, an Emergency under the provision of Article 352 of the Constitution was also declared in the District. The overall responsibility for a massive counter insurgency operation was given to Major General Sanghat Singh, GOC 101 Communication Zone with Headquarters at Shillong. The first army battalion, the 18th Sikh Regiment advanced from Silchar into the hills towards Aizawl on 3rd March, 1966 and with some minor skirmishes on the way, linked up with the besieged garrison at Aizawl. On March 8, 1966, the 2nd and 11thGurkha Rifles moved towards Champhai and the 3rd Bihar Regiment towards Lunglei. Lunglei was secured by the Indian army on March 14, and Champhai on March 15. On 14th and 15th March, 1966, the 5th Paratroopers were flown in by helicopters at Lunglei. The army secured Indo-East Pakistan border areas on 17th March.
Soon, the entire length and breadth of the District was swamped by India's best army and para-military forces constituting nearly ¼ of the total population of the District. The MNF, being far outnumbered by better equipped India army, both in terms of weapon system and training, had to withdraw to the jungle to start their hit and run tactic of guerrilla warfare. Being equipped with the most dreaded legal law of the jungle, "Armed Forces Special Act, 1958," the army took over the administration of remote villages with iron hand. Giving an unrestraint power to the army, the Act. Provides-
"Any Commissioned Officer, Warrant Officer or any other person of equivalent rank in the armed forces may, in a disturbed area:-
(a) If he is of the opinion that it is necessary so to do for the maintenance of public orders, after giving such due warning as he may consider necessary, fire upon or otherwise, use force; even to causing death, against any person who is acting in contravention of any law or order for the time being enforced in the disturbed area, prohibiting the assembly of five or more person or carrying weapons or things capable of being used as weapons or fire arms, ammunitions or explosives."
(b) "If he is of the opinion that it is necessary so to do, destroy any arm dumps, prepared or fortified positions or shelters from which armed attacks are made or are likely to be made or are attempted to be made or any structure used as a training camp for armed volunteers or utilized as a hideout by armed gangs or absconders wanted for any offence"
(c) "Arrest without warrant, any person who has committed a cognizable offence or against whom a reasonable suspicion exist that he has committed or is about to commit a cognizable offence and may use such force as may be necessary to effect arrest".
The army, armed with this most sophisticated legal weapon conducted ruthless and most inhumane counter-insurgency operation in Mizoram from 1966 till the signing of peace Accord in 1986. Thousands of innocent civilians were killed and thousands more were made physically impaired for no fault of their own. To substantiate this, the writer of this article has to say that his own father has suffered permanent hearing impairment because of the assault by army. The army, while in operation, would make no distinction between loyal citizens and MNF loyalists. Random Human Right Violations, were perpetrated in the name of counter insurgency operation. Every Mizo was a suspect and subjected to physical torture and mental harassment. Referring to this, V L Hluna writes "in those days, being a Mizo itself was a crime".
Not to mention other rights, even right to life itself was denied to the people as even a petty army officers was holding the licence to shot and kill anyone who in his opinion, was MNF or MNF loyalist. Whenever there was an ambush, what the army would do was, instead of pursuing those who were responsible for it, would enter the nearest village, and hoard together the entire population in a school or church building or playground. Separate the women folk from the male; then rape the good looking women, on many occasions, in the full view of their husbands.
To be continued ....
* Dr Th Siamkhum wrote this articlee for The Sangai Express
The writer is Associate Professor, Deptt. Pol. Sc., Churachandpur College, Manipur.
This article was posted on January 16, 2015.
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