What had happened to Manipur ?
- Part 3 -

Puyam Nongdrei *

The Shillong Accord 1949
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The interplay of submissive negotiation, aggressive interference and political favouritism led to the Merger Agreement, 1949

Post-WW II Developments

The Cabinet Mission issued a Memorandum dated 12 May 1946, in regard to the 'States' Treaties and to Paramountcy'. It affirmed that the States will regain the paramount power from the British Crown with the lapse of paramountcy. However, the new political development was to be negotiated between the British India and the States themselves. The formation of two independent Dominions by partitioning the territory of British India opened the options of joining either of the two Dominions or by entering into a federal relationship with one of the Dominion or by entering into a particular arrangement with it or them. They declared that the paramountcy of the British Crown over the States could not be retained nor transferred to the new successor Government(s).

Manipur had the options of joining the Indian Dominion or enter into a particular arrangement with it or remain as an independent State. Here, the importance of the 'viability factor' is worth discussing. The Manipur State Durbar had a strong believe that the State could not stand aloof from the Dominion because of various factors. The mode of negotiation that Manipur had with the Dominion of India was strongly affected by the 'viability factor'. It led to a 'submissive negotiation' with the Indian Dominion which was a manifestation of conscious asymmetrical power relationship between Manipur and the Dominion of India.

India was one of the original members of the United Nations (UN) that signed the Washington Declaration on 1 January 1942. It was represented by Girija Shankar Bajpai as the Indian Agent-General. India was one of the four original members which became a member of the UN as non-sovereign entities. Other three members were Belarus, the Philippines and Ukraine.

India was, thus, a founding member of the UN since 30 October 1945. According to the Indian Independence Act, 1947, the two independent Dominions of India and Pakistan took birth on the 15th of August 1947. But Pakistan joined the UN on 30 September 1947 only. How could the Indian colony became a member of the UN? Exceptions happened when the powerful allies are shaping the course of humanity either for their interests or for the other allies. India, before and after the partition, was one of the most important country with which Britain did not want to severe ties or damage its relationship.

Powerful and bigger princely States like Travancore, Hyderabad and Kashmir did their best to get international recognition and the UN membership. With support from the British Government and Pakistan, Hyderabad and Kashmir could have been admitted as sovereign members of the UN. Britain did not want to get entangled in the sub-continent's political and diplomatic mess after 15th August 1947 accept facilitating the two independent Dominions to become functioning entities with the help of the Governor-General.

Covertly and overtly, the British parliament left the affairs of the Indian/princely States to the last Viceroy and first Governor-General of India, Louis Lord Mountbatten. The secret mission of Sir Conrad Corfield to London few months before the transfer of power could not bring a better deal for the princely States.

In the book "Shillong 1949", the author late Mayengbam Anandmohan mentions that he accompanied king Bodhachandra as his ADC during the king's visit to Shillong to meet Governor-General Lord Mountbatten (most probably in April 1948). There is no mention about the purpose of the visit and details of discussions held between the duo and the king of Manipur in the available materials accessed to write this article. Why did Lord Mountbatten visit Shillong few months before the end of his term as Governor-General in June 1948?

Why was the king of Manipur invited to Shillong? If Lord Mountbatten persuaded king Bodhachandra to join the Dominion of India by signing necessary documents, what was the response of king Bodhachandra? Can we get any useful documents relating to this transaction at Mountbatten's Broadlands Archives?

In the book "The Story of the Integration of Indian States", the Congress lobby to get almost all the Indian States acceded to the Dominion of India with the help of military and Lord Mountbatten was suggested by V. P. Menon to Sardar Patel. With Nehru's approval, the plan was initiated to made the rulers sign the Instrument of Accession.

The bargaining was over the "wounds of partition" of British India. The then Indian leaders led by Sardar Patel and Secretary VK Menon wanted to ensure the accession of almost all the Indian States in return of the partition by winning Lord Mountbatten. Interestingly, Mountbatten agreed to the plan and he played his role in the accession of many states.

The aggressive policy of the Indian leaders to integrate the Indian States was because of some well-known reasons. Some of these are:
1) To bear the cost of partition;
2) Fear of a weak India;
3) Fear of external aggression and interference;
4) Dream of a great India;
5) Lord Mountbatten and British Government supported the plan overtly or covertly;
6) Failure of the Indian States to assert collectively;
7) A geopolitical competitor to check China in Asia;
8) Britain wanted avoiding diplomatic tangles of many independent States

The Chancellor of the Chamber of Princes, the Maharaja of Patiala was told by VP Menon: "'independent of us, you cannot exist". The agenda for the conference of the rulers held on 25 July 1947 included: (1) Accession of the States on defence, external affairs and communications; (2) Standstill Agreement; (3) Advisory Council for the States Department; (4) Channels of correspondence and representation of central Government in the States. The Congress leaders managed to split the rulers just before the last Chamber of Princes to win as many States as possible for accession. The drafts of the Instrument of Accession and Standstill Agreement were circulated to the rulers at the special session of the Chamber on 25 July.

Manipur could not have a 'symmetrical negotiation' over the terms of arrangements to be made for a cordial relationship with the Indian Dominion. Though the desire of a 'cordial relationship' with the Dominion of India was expressed clearly, the asymmetrical power relationship was quite clear. Besides, the blessing of the British Government to the Indian nationalists for integration of the princely States is well-known after the plan of partition was agreed upon. Lack of political consciousness on the part of Manipuri leaders and acts of submissive negotiation were fully exploited pushing Manipur down the drain of Part C state.

After the Anglo-Manipur War in 1891, Barrister Manomohan Ghose submitted a Memorandum of Arguments entitled "Did The Manipur Princes Obtain A Fair Trial?". Manipur was denied a sovereign status in the first place. Instead, Her Majesty Victoria forego her right to annex Manipur in their official words but the once friendly kingdom was forced to pay an annual tribute till the end of WWII.

It will be wrong for us to expect anything worth naming from Britain after 15th August 1947. Britain did not build the empire on the basis of friendship and respect. Manipur kingdom helped the British empire as ally for a good number of years and in return it was helped but was denied a respectable place. The debates in the British parliament have things to say about the occidentals' view of the orientals. Kashmir and Hyderabad could have offered many things to Britain compared to Manipur. What logic should we apply to think that Britain would have supported the cause of Manipur in the British parliament and the UN against the wishes of Sardar Patel and Nehru?

Taking advantage of the situation, the Dominion of India engaged in an 'aggressive interference' in the affairs of Manipur. The 'Operation Polo' in Hyderabad from 13 to 18 September 1948 was a clear line of action in case Manipur wanted to put up resistance like in 1891. This is clearly supported by the words of Sardar Patel at Birla House and the subsequent military preparation made by the Indian military forces to face any eventuality after extracting the Merger Agreement signature from the detained king Bodhachandra. The preparation of the 4th Assam Rifles in Imphal and the arrival of the 1st Assam Regiment were indication of the steps taken to take over Manipur at any cost.

Any supposition is not a wise act but sometimes our minds love to play with such things. Manipur could have maintained a cordial relationship under a special arrangement with the Indian Dominion with the backing of the British Government. A Bhutan-like status with special relationship with India could have developed with recognition from India and Burma (Myanmar). Now, the changed international situation has brought changes to the 'viability factor' and some in Manipur dream of an independent existence. Many battles might have over but the war continues.

See a List of Reference Materials for this article



To be continued ...