The unfolding Kuki–Meitei conflict in Manipur
- Part 2 -

Pushpita Das *

The forcible destruction of illicit poppy cultivation and arrests of villagers, however, is perceived by the Kuki community as depriving them of their livelihood because the ‘affected cultivators’ never received the compensation promised by the State Government.

Consequently, these drives against encroachers and illicit poppy cultivators attracted large-scale protests, especially in the Kuki-dominated districts. Many of such protests also turned violent, the most recent being the one held on 27 April 2023 in Churachandpur.

The State Government views the protests as anti-Government and claims that the protesters were heavily influenced and instigated by the Kuki militant organisations especially the Kuki National Army (KNA) and Zomi Revolutionary Army (ZRA), who were not only providing shelter to illegal migrants from Myanmar, but also encouraging illegal poppy cultivation and drug trade.

In fact, on 10 March 2023, the Biren Singh Government decided to withdraw from the tripartite Suspension of Operations (SoO) agreement with the Kuki militant organisations. This unilateral withdrawal from the agreement has not only upset the Kuki community but also put a question mark on the resolution of the Kuki militancy problem in the State.

The peace talks between the Government and the militant groups, which started in 2016, had generated hopes among the Kuki community that after all their demand for a separate Kukiland will be met. This hope had, in fact, propelled them to support the BJP during the 2022 Manipur elections.

Demand for a separate Kukiland

The Kukis have been demanding self-determination for their community since long. The earliest case where the Kukis demanded a separate State for themselves was in 1960, in the aftermath of the 1957 elections to elect village chiefs in the State.

The Kuki community argued that the system of electing the village chief under the Village Authorities Act of 1956 was a means to “do away with the rights of the chiefs over land”, and given that the Kukis had traditional system of unelected village chieftains, they opposed it. This desire to safeguard their interests was also reinforced by the fact that the Kukis do not share a cordial relationship with the Meiteis and the Nagas.

The Kukis are resentful towards the Meiteis because they feel that the Meitei-dominated State Government kept their areas backward and did not provide them adequate political representation. Their unease with the Naga community stemmed from the demand of the National Socialist Council of Nagalim (NSCN) to include the area inhabited by the Kukis into the Greater Nagalim.

The demand for a separate State, however, became prominent following clashes with the Nagas in 1990s. Between 1992 and 1997, the Kukis were subjected to ethnic cleansing by the Naga militant groups, following which multiple Kuki armed groups demanding separate/independent Kukiland cropped up in the State.

After years of violence, 23 insurgent outfits (later increased to 25) belonging to the Kuki, Zo, Paite and Hmar groups organised themselves under two umbrella organisations—KNO (Kuki National Organisation) and UPF (United People’s Front)—and signed a SoO with the Union and the Manipur Governments in August 2008.

In 2016, eight years after signing of the SoO agreement, the Union and the State governments started peace negotiations with the KNO and UPF. Even after several rounds of talks, no headway could be made because of the difference in the demands of the KNO and the UPF. The KNO demanded a separate Kuki State while the UPF insisted on a State-within a State under Article 244A of the Indian Constitution.

At present, it appears that both the groups have reconciled their differences and have come around to accepting a Kukiland Terri- torial Council carved out of Kuki-inhabited districts of Churachandpur, Pherzawl, Chandel, Tengnoupal, Kangpokpi and Kamjong. The Territorial Council, according to them, should be modelled on the Bodoland Territorial Council which was established under the Sixth Schedule in 2003.

In fact, the impressive win of the Hill People’s Alliance (HPA), an alliance of independent candidates backed by the UPF in Chura-chandpur district in 2015 Autonomous District Council elections also indicate a strong desire among the Kukis for a Kukiland Territorial Council.

The State Government dominated by the Meiteis is, however, against the creation of Kukiland Territorial Council as they see it as the first step towards creation of a separate Kuki State. In fact, when 10 MLAs including seven from his own party, demanded separate administration for the Kuki community in May 2023, Biren Singh categorically rejected the proposal and asserted that “the territorial integrity of Manipur will be protected at all costs.”

The ongoing conflict between the Meitei and Kuki communities is also a manifestation of the larger Valley-Hill divide which has bedevilled the process of peace and reconciliation in Manipur. The Valley-Hill Divide

Manipur has two distinct geographical features—the Imphal Valley and the Hills which surround the Valley. The Valley constitutes the five districts and the Hill constitutes 10 districts.The Imphal Valley covers 10 per cent of the land area of Manipur and rest 90 per cent is covered by the Hills. Ethnically, Manipur has three main groups—the Meiteis, the Nagas, and the Kukis.

The Meiteis constitute 53 per cent of the total population and are primarily settled in the Valley districts of East and West Imphal, Thoubal, Kakching, Bishnupur and Jiribam. The Naga (17 per cent) and Kuki communities (26 per cent) which together constitute 41 per cent of the population are categorised into 34 Scheduled Tribes in the State. The Nagas are concentrated in the North consisting mainly of Senapati, Ukhrul, Tamenglong and Chandel districts.

The Kuki tribes primarily populate the southern hills comprising Churachandpur, Kangpokpi, Chandel and Tengnoupal districts. This disproportionate spatial distribution between the Meitei community and the Tribes people is the crux of the problem. The Meitei community feels that even though they constitute 53 per cent of the population, they are confined to only 10 per cent of the land in the valley.

Even in the valley, they argue that they are getting squeezed because tribes people are buying land and settling there, while being non-tribal, they cannot buy land in the hills because of the protection provided to the tribes people under Article 371 (c) of the Constitution.

The Meitei community further claims that in addition to the tribes people, many ‘outsiders’ including illegal migrants from Bangladesh and Myanmar and people from rest of the country are settling in their land. They, therefore, argue that if the community has to “preserve” and “save the ancestral land, tradition, culture, and language”, they need the ST status.

The Tribal communities, as evident, are opposed to the demand of the Meitei community for ST status on the grounds that Meiteis are a dominant community in the State with 40 of the 60 legislative seats occupied by them. They further argue that Meitei language is included in the Eighth Schedule of the Constitution and they are educationally, socially and economically better off than the tribes people.

Therefore, if ST status is bestowed upon the Meiteis, they will not only corner all the Government jobs and other benefits, hitherto granted to the tribes by the Constitution, but also grab land belonging to the tribes people as restrictions on purchasing land in the hills will not apply to them.

The fear of losing their land has become so prominent among the Meitei community that they started demanding the extension of Inner Line Permit (ILP) in the State to protect the rights of Manipuri ‘indigenous’ people. Subsequently, in December 2019, the Union Government extended the ILP in the State. The State Government in June 2022 decided that 1961 shall be the ‘base year’ to decide who is a ‘native resident’.

This Government order is opposed by the tribes people. They assert that in 1961, hardly any census official visited their villages because of poor connectivity. In addition, during that time, most of the village chiefs were illiterate and therefore did not keep records of the villagers. As a result, the tribes people do not have the required documents to prove that they are native residents of Manipur.

The Hill-Valley divide is most evident in the administration of these two geographical entities. During the colonial times, the British deliberately introduced the ‘hill-valley divide’ by separating the administration of the hills from the plains.19

This divide was also accentuated by the religious divide between the two wherein the Meiteis embraced Vaishnavism patronised by their Kings of Manipur and the hill people were converted to Christianity by the missionaries who were allowed to function in the hill areas.

The British policy of keeping the tribes administratively separated from the valley finally ended with lapse of British paramountcy and the enforcement of the Manipur State Constitution Act in 1947, wherein the responsibility of administering the hill areas was entrusted to the Council of Ministers. The Council of Ministers had two elected persons from the hills who were in charge of hill affairs, forests and agriculture.

To be continued .....

** Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrikar IDSA or of the Government of India