'Prisoner's Dilemma', Manipur's Dilemma

By:- Loghan H *

Evolutionary Biologists' quest for a meaningful explanation of cooperative human behavior hit upon the concept of 'Prisoner's Dilemma' (PD), a concept primarily borrowed from Game Theory in Mathematics, to unearth the dynamic and complex cooperative human behavior.

It attempts to explain the endless dynamism and complexity in human behavior and decision making process. We, human beings, are always confronted with situations which require decision making in every step. And every decision making process is influenced by an endless number of factors, right from molecular level (selection of genes) to higher level (cultural/political level).

Amidst the complexity and variability, there are also discernable patterns and commonality in human decision making processes. We all invariably tend to make decisions, based on one's perceived maximization probabilities/potentials, irrespective of the consequences to others.

In a simple classical model of Prisoner's Dilemma (PD), two suspects with insufficient evidence to convict are offered deals (separately) to cooperate or betray one another to minimize his or her own time in jail.

The trade-off is that if one betrays the other, then one (defector) walks free and other gets maximum sentence; if they both cooperate (both remaining silent) then the jail term is nominal or both walk free; and if both defect, then both get sentenced. Since the only concern of each individual player (prisoner) is maximizing his or her own payoff, without any concern for the other player's payoff, defection seems to be the preferred strategy.

In such a scenario, rational choice leads the two players to both play 'defect', even though each player's individual reward would be greater if they both played 'cooperatively', resulting to a sub-optimal solution. At the end, one ends up playing a 'non-zero-sum' game, in which both or either of the players is in the loosing side.

The classical prisoner's dilemma:

	Prisoner-B(Cooperate)	Prisoner-B(Defect)
Prisoner -A (Cooperate)	Each gets 6 months in jail	P-A: 10 yrs in jail; P-B: Walks free
Prisoner -A (Defect)	P-A: Walks free; P-B: 10 yrs in jail	Each serves 5 years in jail

The biggest challenge that Manipur faces today is the challenge to overcome this non-zero-sum game, being played by all of us. Every one of us tries to maximize his or her payoff, regardless of the consequences to others. Just imagine if we all (job seekers) refuse to fork-out the usual bribes to get selected for a job in the state, then we all would have benefited immensely in every respect.

But, unfortunately, it never happens. Every one of us plays the game of 'defection' with the expectation that bribing the officials would maximize one's returns (getting the job), not realizing that others had done the same. However, as in the case of PD, if every player defects then the pay-offs need not always be at the optimum level.

Nonetheless, the fear of possible negative consequences of not paying (being cooperative) when other players are paying (playing defection) is so great that we all end-up defecting (paying the bribe), and in the process minimizing the optimum benefit. Therefore, in real sense, bribing for a post is unlikely to have any influence on the selection process, if all other factors were similar.

Playing 'cooperative' alone has become not only non-effective but also a liability at times. Dr. Kishan paid with his life for not following the steps taken by his other fellow officers, pay-up and follow the dictates. It is an open secret that every officer in the state has to sing to the tunes of his or her political masters or else he or she may end up in the docks.

Just imagine if all the officials in unison refused to sing to the tunes of their political masters (cooperative), definitely that will put an end to many of their miseries and threats. Instead, just like individual job-seekers, every one of them plays the game of 'defect' to gain personnel mileage and all of them end up in the loosing side (make themselves vulnerable).

The same goes with the present council of ministers or elected members in the present state government – the chances of being cut-off from the largesse of Chief Minister is so great that every one of them succumbs to it and plays 'defect'. No wonder then, while the state burns for more than two months, what the ruling legislatures asked for in the CLP meet was a re-shuffle in the state cabinet.

We all human beings are selfish in nature. Cooperative human behavior therefore is strictly dominated by defection, so the only possible equilibrium to maintain the system is for all individuals to 'defect.' In such a situation, no matter what the other individual does, one individual will always gain a greater payoff by playing 'defect.'

Since playing 'defect' in any situation is more beneficial than 'cooperating,' all rational players defect. The larger question then is – can we come out of the present equilibrium in the state, which benefits only a select few and those who betray? The answer may be 'YES', but the realization of it will not be a simple one-way process. It would have been a simple task if we all played 'cooperation'; but that's one strategy that may never happen in a real life situation.

Theoretically, if each player has an opportunity to punish the other player for previous non-cooperative play, then there is a possibility of maintaining equilibrium of cooperation (beneficial to all). It was also suggested that if these encounters were repeated over a long period of time with many players, each with different strategies, greedy strategies tended to do very poorly in the long run while more altruistic strategies did better.

Therefore, as for our non-performing politicians, the democratic election process should have served as a deterrent or controlling mechanism through which common people could make their representatives accountable. In such a scenario, the incentive to defect can be overcome by the threat of punishment. But, the politicians are there for a short period of time or limited interactions (number of elections); hence the chances of getting punished for 'defect' remain slim.

Multilayer interaction system in human decision making process makes it the more difficult to make people more accountable. More often than not people play different sets of roles at different levels and at different points of time – a person who may be very corrupt (who always betrays) to some may be the savior (cooperative) to others.

For instance, many of the ministers or ruling MLAs may have been very corrupt or very unpopular among the masses, but he or she may have been the savior to his or her electorates or extremely popular in his or her constituency. Unfortunately, the responsibility to make the local representatives more accountable rests with the electorates of his/her constituency, not with the general public.

No wonder then the ongoing protests of 23rd July killings and subsequent closers of schools evoke little response from the elected members. Until we close the existing gap (both in time and space) between players and public issues for accountability, as in the case of other advanced states or developed countries, it is going to be a tall task to expect any positive outcome in the near future.

Of course, there are issues that transcend beyond narrow political and communal boundaries – it had happened in the recent past (demand for full statehood, June 18th uprising, Manorama killing, ongoing struggle of Sharmila, etc. to name a few) and it is bound to happen in future again.

Why one must wait to act until such unfortunate and extreme steps occur? The responsibilities lie with each one of us. If we all continue to play the game of 'defect' and expect others to 'cooperate', empirical evidences suggest that changes are not going to happen.

It's against the basic principles of human nature. We need to cultivate and nurture a system in which 'cooperation' gets higher payoffs than 'defection.' The sooner we realized that we are playing a non-zero sum game, the better it would be for all of us!

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* Loghan H is a regular contributor to e-pao.net. The writer can be contacted at loghan(dot)man(at)gmail(dot)com
This article was webcasted at e-pao.net on 04th November 2009.

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