Land and territoriality in the Northeast
- Part 2 -
- Politics of ethnicity and armed violence in Manipur -

Lokendra Arambam *

On the other hand, the Meetei national movement that surfaced in the valley of Manipur professed relations of respect and mutual support to the Naga insurgency in the late seventies and early eighties. When the NNC was in deep throes of mutual recrimination and violence as a result of the Shillong Accord, the Meetei insurgent outfits were giving shelter and sustenance to many underground Naga cadres in Meetei homes in suburban Imphal.

It was learnt that in the tumultuous periods of division and split amongst the NSCN cadres in 1988, Meetei insurgent leaders were at pains to effect compromise amongst the Naga leaders. The chapter of ethnic unity and collective efforts against the Indian state earlier is now dead and gone.

Ethnicity and ethnic bias in the wielding of power and influence in the so-called democratic institutions like the legislature seem to have a diluted presence, though ethnicity was the main plank for political mobilization by the hill tribes.

The Meeteis in the plains, who had experienced deep traditions of polity governance and maintenance of community equilibrium in their erstwhile history, had been ruthlessly exposed to the gradual crumbling of their national life through rapid ethnicization in the overall counter-insurgency designs.

In the course of the armed conflict between instruments of Indian state and non-state Meetei actors, we have witnessed a critical stage of armed strike by the valley insurgents in the late seventies and the resultant counter-insurgency operations by the Indian state with intensive intrusions into the domestic lives of the citizens.

The public sphere in Manipur was reeling in the processes of coping with violence, disappearances of sons and relations and raping of women by the military. Incidents of violations of dignity of women in the hills were rapidly responded to by civil society in the plains.

Though the Meetei population was rather slow in owning up the narratives of collective suffering in the hands of the "oppressive" Indian state, mutual respect and intensive relationships were forged which countered ethnic divide. During the eighties, the violent engagements of armed conflict were rather confined to major geographical locations in the villages of the plains where the Indian military had a distinctive advantage.

Even though the urban insurgency started by the PLA (People's Liberation Army) was one of the finest in Asia - second only to that of Saigon (presently Ho Chi Minh City), as observed by Yambem Laba - the spatial organization of military engagements was however effectively controlled by the superior military power of the Indian state.

It was only when the surrounding hills became an active site of military confrontation between the Meetei non-state actors and the Indian army in the nineties; urgent policy shifts became essential in counter-insurgency operations. Ethnicity became an ardent ploy as the best and effective means of using the hill populations against the Meetei non-state actors who had substantial control of major spaces in the hill terrain.

The art of mountain warfare cultivated by the Meetei nationalists could be countered by strategic, methodical approaches for military presence in the hills and unprecedented civic action programmes to "convert" the local populations. The Assam Rifles became a friend of the hill people in the post-nineties when the mother of all insurgencies, the NSCN (1M), agreed to sit on the negotiating table in 1997 and enter into political dialogue with the Centre.

The prolongation of armed resistance by the Meetei armed opposition groups could be countered by meticulous weaning of tribal groups and communities from the logic of ethnic unity. For, contemporary developmental interventions by systems of predation cultivated by politicians, bureaucrats, police and tribal elites lent itself to manipulation as an overall picture of discrimination and exploitation of the marginal hill regions.

The twenty-first century saw the emergence of India as a strong Asiatic power vis-a-vis China. And the Look-East Policy which was propelled by the logic of globalization would have induced a culture of de-territorialization in the civic processes of intense economic interaction.

But realistic statecraft emphasized the permanent "occupation" of the development frontier by the defence establishments in view of the fragile national security scenario. For, significant populations of Mongoloid racial categories were still un-assimilated into the pan-Indian nationhood and active presence of armed opposition groups in the difficult mountain terrain should have to be permanently neutralized.

This could only be achieved through meticulous cultivation of ethnic jealousies, prejudices and primordial passions through a system of calculated interventions by predatory capitalism and pitting of ethnic leaderships in the partaking of pleasure and profit from the relationship with the Indian state.

Those who have abjured the principle of armed violence could now be projected as genuine leaders of the people. And people like Zoramthanga, the Chief Minister of Mizoram, and Thuingaleng Muivah, the protagonist of Nagalim, are now icons of peace-loving people of the Northeast!

Zale'n-Gam or Kuki Homeland

The issue of the Kuki Zale'n-gam movement, however, draws less attention in the Indian media than that of Nagalim. Because of intrinsic migratory habits of the slash-and-burn cultivators of yore, these cognate Kuki-Chin communities straddled across various regional habitats in Myanmar, Manipur, North Cachar Hills (Assam), Mizoram, Tripura, Bangladesh, etc.

A stable resource base which would facilitate development of a modern political movement was therefore lacking amongst these tribes. The concept of Zale'n-gam or the Kuki nation also seem to have had certain anomalies regarding united political aspirations amongst the Kuki clans and other cognate tribes.

The Chin tribes in Myanmar envisaged freedom from the political domination of the Myanmarese, while their brethren in India sought a "Homeland" or Kuki state within the Indian Union. Though not much information is available about their political activities in the neighbouring Chin Hills of Myanmar, the national imageries of these people in India were developed from the intense experiences of sacrifices and defeat at the hands of the British imperial forces in the Anglo-Kuki war of 19l7-l9.

The sacrifices and exemplary activities of chieftains like Chenjapao Doungel, Lhukhomang Haokip, Tintong Haokip, Enjakhup Kholhou and Khotingthang Sitlhou in the above war provided inspiring memories for the development of narratives of the Kuki independence struggle.

In fact, tales of their experiences of migration and settlement amidst other communities, and confrontations with the British imperial forces since the middle of the nineteenth century, as well as the stories of their participation in the Indian National Army of Netaji Subhas Chan-dra Bose during the World War II offered vivid testimony to the freedom loving spirit of the Kuki people.

The confrontation with the Naga "national" movement and tragic experiences of the "ethnic-cleansing" in 1992-93 made the Kukis in Manipur dependent on the Indian political and military establishment for succour and help. This violent engagement within ethnic communities of Manipur led to progressive militarization of ethnic relations and development of ultra-militant ambitions amongst younger generations.

Overall, armed movements in the Northeast were also fuelled by the Indian state, which extended support of arms and money to mutually contentious groups for defence of the ethnic selves from violent aggressions from the ethnic "other." The recent rise and spread of the Kuki National Army, hitherto confined to Myanmar, in Manipur and other neighbouring regions was an outcome of militarization of ethnicity in the Northeast, where the Indian state played a vital role.

Kuki-Chin aspirations for identities, though varied and diverse due to clan and group loyalties, were however strident since the end of the World War II as the 1950s ushered in a completely changed environment for ethnic self-consciousness, assertion and mobilization, where propagation of Homeland with armed resources was an inevitable result.

To be continued ....