NSCN-IM Impasse; Possible A New Unity

Lai JN *

Challenges:

Owing to the complex challenges attaching to the Nagas' neighbors in Assam, Arunachal Pradesh, Manipur and even beyond, it is much suspicious that the Naga conflict may not be resolved with good mechanisms of justice and peace. Simply therefore, without an engagement of the key 'Political Armed Organisations' (PAOs)/Armed Opposition Groups and concerns of the communities of the North East, a resolution may not surface.

First, in case, Government of India (GoI) is affirmative towards the accomplishment of Naga peace deal, and all Naga political armed organizations and communities have involved themselves in the endeavor, there may be a redrawing of the territory or may be a layout of a new administrative landscape out of current NE. In fact, very likely it will come along a fear of escalation of violence and hostility from the communities of Nagas' neighbors.

Second, in case NSCN-IM singularly resolved or compromised the Naga issue with GoI somehow without participation of other Naga PAOs and Communities, there may be rather a severe and prolonged feud of bloodshed in Nagaland and around and even beyond.

Third, in case, there is a new accommodation of the various levels of leaders of NSCN and other Naga PAOs in the Indian electoral activities and in the likewise engagement, it may contribute limited harm and tension to the existing NE conflict.

Attitude:

It is a matter of fact that there is armed conflict in the North East India which is multi-faceted; between GoI and numerous political armed organizations, and among various ethnic armed organizations and among ethnic communities.

Again, there is implicit understanding about frame of minds and physiological limitations among the belligerent parties or stake holders, except the general public. Political armed organizations might have well visualized India; how her might is, what she intends to, and certainly have experienced the amount of her commitment and quality in handling peace and justice. Likewise India observes, analyzes and dissects the weaknesses and strengths of the PAOs of North East. More or less she is familiar with the psychology, what the organizations are combating for, which organizations like what, how easy and difficult to deal with, etc.

It looks very visible that India may be waiting for some sort of natural deaths of the PAOs to be happened sooner or later. However it is very likely that the waiting games may not be fulfilled so wishfully, maybe because of seen and unseen forces of China and USA. At the same time, interestingly, principal PAOs may also be waiting for domestic crumbling of India on her own in terms of splitting her territory into three or more or political paralysis triggered by Hindu fundamentalism, colossal corruption, indigent governance, corporate game, etc.

Necessities:

The stake holders have to trajectorise a favorable future for a reason that the juncture is crucial; the timing is a real challenge but chances are also lurking somewhere. Why not a "New Alternative Unity" of the North East by accommodating other Political Armed Organizations and communities of NE other then consolidating NSCN-IM.

The following could be a rough architecture of a solution but empirical necessities someway and may be pondered over towards the justice mechanisms regarding the present NSCN-IM impasse;

1. A unification of the (majority/principal) Political Armed Organisations of North East India by investing all their resources, courage and sincerity towards giving birth to a new (Nation) State sharing negotiable configuration with the Republic of India.

2. The other NE states that have low intensity of armed conflict or absence of PAOs will also be invited. Those who have not joined at the time of inception may be considered later. Thus, it will capacitate a desired inclusiveness of the communities of NE and even beyond. [necessarily all the present seven states may not be part of.]

3. The name of the new State may be called the United Peoples Land of Indo Myanmar (UPLIM) (or United Peoples Land of Sub-Himalaya). [UPLIM may be a good nomenclature for it retains some key vocabulary and implications of PAOs in NE namely LIM, IM and Indo Myanmar for NSCN; United, Peoples and Land for other in Manipur, Assam and other.]

4. In order to legislate for and govern the UPLIM, and to practice a good socialism, and to deliver fundamental rights of life, liberty, equality and dignity to the peoples of the new State, there will be a Parliament that may be called Peoples House (PH). [The structure and modus operandi of the PH may be considered and derived from the other good parliamentary practices of the world.]

5. Currency and Communication may be retained with the Republic of India; Defence, External Affairs, Natural Resources may be negotiated towards a concurrent list; and the rest could be better in the PH affairs.

6. The key members or leaders of the PAOs, and from the other states where PAOs do not exist, political/social leaders will be member representatives in the Parliament/PH [ whom may be called People Representative (PR)]

7. The modality of how and what numbers of PRs may be determined by considering various basis and will be settled democratically among PAOs in consultation with the NE communities/peoples by considering the optimum economic-political space of ethnic/indigenous minority. [Will Bodo, Naga, Kuki, or Meetei have one PR for each of them or will drop down to ancestral tribal communities and clans or will it based on the population ratio?]

8. The first five year tenure of the PRs may be reserved and compensated for the PAOs, afterwards PRs will be elected through universal franchise by their respective peoples/communities or otherwise.

9. The existing State Assemblies will remain so that there will be participation of the MLAs in the UPLIM provincial governing activities. However, it will be with the reformation of power division and functional sharing and in conjugation with PH structure. [It may minimize the outward dismay and eventual turbulent of the existing political personalities and parties.]

10. A wider candidature ship in the existing constituent assemblies election will be validated to accommodate the members and leaders of PAOs by migrating their organisations into electoral political parties or joining existing parties or floating new ones. Thus it may extend a meaningful participation in the governing activities for the new (Nation) State.

Confidence Building Measures:

The bigger responsibility, commitment and timely initiative should be from the GoI. In case she is affirmative regarding the following peace-process necessities, the United Nations Organisation may reward her a power position in the Security Council;

1. Commence the demilitarization in NE by withdrawing military forces.

2. Initiate unilateral ceasefire with the active belligerent PAOs reluctant to come to peace work.

3. Repeal the Armed Forces (Special Powers) Act, 1958.

4. Check the human rights violations perpetrated by counter insurgency police forces.

5. New invitation to PAOs for the conflict resolution, justice and peace building. If the above proposal are posing real hard time to GoI then may

6. Extend a new referendum/plebiscite for NE people for deciding new Sate/UPLIM proposal.