Beyond India's Political Border : Anchoring the Core Issue
- Part 2 -

By:- Sanatomba Kangujam *

Issues such as rights violation, militarisation and enforcement of black laws are bound to occur in times of war or in any occupied territory. If this is the reality, is it politically prudent to place our demand before the Government of India to stop violation of human rights and remove AFSPA, under its Constitutional framework in the making of which we did not participate? Isn't it more logical to demand, instead, to resolve the outstanding political conflict that has remained intractable for so many decades?

Besides, the politics of integration and integrity which are primarily based on territorial claim and ethnic affiliation, directly resulting often into communal tension and inter-group clashes are structurally linked with the core-conflict. These are post-1949 phenomena exacerbated by the imposition of an alien rule. All such marginal issues will gradually get transformed and wither away only when the 'core issue' is resolved or transformed through sustained and informed political engagement.

The conflict between India and Manipur right from the very inception has never been an internal matter of India nor a mere law and order problem. Rather, it is purely a conflict between two nations that has now assumed the form of international armed conflict. An exclusively law and order situation would not have called for intervention by the Army the deployment of which is indispensable only under certain condition marked by high occurrence of armed-conflict with an international character.

Otherwise, civil authority and police forces would be more than enough to deal with petty domestic matters like the law and order problem. What is more significant to note in this context is the understanding of implications inherent in the continued enforcement of AFSPA 1958 in Manipur as well as in the North East including Kashmir.

A replication of the British Colonial Act, AFSPA is meant to be applied only in an occupied territory. The question pertaining to why the GoI refrains from enforcing it in other parts of India seriously affected by Naxal violence is pregnant with far-reaching implications.

There exist in India a number of legal mechanisms that can effectively tackle any sort of law and order situation. Then, why this differential treatment for Kashmir and the North East in general and Manipur in particular? That the North-East never formed a part of the mainstream imagination of Indian nationhood is clearly evident from this point.

The GoI will find it increasingly difficult to deny the existence of armed conflict in Manipur when scores of insurgents are being killed in encounter (as claimed by the State) and direct military confrontation in the battle fields while a large number of them are currently being lodged in prisons as undertrials. Self contradictory positions held by the Indian Government in claiming those killed and arrested by the ISF as insurgents and at the same time denying the objective reality of the prevalence of conflict situation in Manipur amounts to political decapitation of the worst type.

At this juncture, we may recall the 'Operation All Clear' launched in 2004 by the Indian Army involving 6,000 troops to recapture Sajik Tampak, a liberated zone in Southern Manipur. At that time, Sajik Tampak was almost turned into what can be called an Insurgent Headquarters from where different rebel groups directed their operations.

It was for the first time that the insurgent groups were successful in establishing some sorts of a 'liberated zone' or a 'controlled area' in certain pockets of Manipur thereby rendering themselves nearly elevated to the status of 'belligerent groups' from being 'insurgent groups'. The Indian armies were able to drive out the insurgents holding up in the said area only after engaging in a series of battles.

We may also cite the 'Operation New Samtal' launched by the Indian Army in Chandel District where the UNLF had firmly established its base for a considerable period of time. The Indian Army took more than three months to recapture the Khengjoi Range and the adjoining areas from the clutch of the UNLF. Still then, the Army cannot claim to have won a decisive battle against the UNLF as the latter occasionally staged a come back to re-establish their control whenever and wherever the Army demonstrated any sign of laxity.

Besides, mention may also be made of the recent "Operation Summer Storm" undertaken by the 57 Mountain Divisions to sanitise the Loktak Lake from presence of insurgents. In all these military operations, sophisticated technologies and heavy war machines including Helicopter Gunships, Unmanned Aerial Vehicles and other heavy arms were extensively used by the Army.

All such instances clearly point to the fact that the GoI has been waging some sorts of a "Hidden War" in Manipur for the last 30 years under the facade of maintaining law and order problem. It is said to be a hidden war in a sense that the GoI does not declare a State of Emergency in spite of the intensity of the situation which warrants extensive deployment of military.

Or, is it that the necessity for the proclamation of emergency does not arise as the war is taking place in an occupied territory which lies far beyond the political borders of India.

Seeking a military solution to an issue which is entirely political in nature would prove to be highly suicidal for India in the long run. Extensive deployment of Army and continued enforcement of AFSPA have only led to escalation of the existing conflict with proliferation of more armed groups than ever before, leave aside any sign of improvement in the law and order front.

Over-reliance on military means has absolutely failed to produce any substantive outcome. The sooner India realises the indispensability of a political approach to the protracted Indo-Manipur conflict; the better will be for both the GoI and the people of Manipur.

India cannot afford to wage such a costly war against Manipur mainly in view of the deepening financial crisis besetting the global world and also considering its commitment to international peace and justice. Besides, the people of Manipur cannot remain indefinitely entrapped in the cross fire while the world is fast advancing towards a higher trajectory of human civilisation.

An earnest effort needs to be initiated by both the parties to the conflict with a view to explore various alternatives for resolving or transforming the Indo-Manipur conflict. Both the GoI and the insurgent groups of Manipur should engage in a sustained political dialogue and not 'Peace-Talk' which is highly misleading.

Historical experiences inform that peace-talk is nothing more than talking about the terms of surrender and negotiating the benefits of rehabilitation. It lacks political reciprocity and the terms and conditions of the agreement that may follow it are often mostly dictated by the more powerful party.

Political dialogue, on the other hand, is a more progressive term which involves mutual understanding and appreciation of their (the high contracting parties) respective political stands and difficulties. Over and above, a dialogue underscores equality between the two participants. Political dialogue also consists of exploring and arriving at a mutually acceptable solution by way of negotiating the terms of political arrangement even to the extent of restructuring the existing Constitutional system.

Ceasefire is not a necessary precondition for engaging in political dialogue. There can be a political dialogue without ceasefire. The only pre-condition for any impending political dialogue is the recognition of the fact that the conflict between India and Manipur is 'political'.

Unless all the existing different quarters of concerns particularly the GoI officially recognise the centrality of the issue and political nature of the conflict, restoration of peace and normalcy in Manipur will ever remain an impossible task to accomplish.

Concluded....