When the agreement of cease-fire was signed between the Government of India and NSCN(IM) in 1997, there was a surge of optimism about the prospects of peace in the North-East India more particularly in Nagaland. The fire from the barrel of the guns had been ceased, no doubt but about the implementation of the terms and conditions put forward by the NSCN(IM) at the time of signing the truce pact, it is still a puzzle.

The perpetual extension of the terms of the cease-fire on the pretext of proper implementation of the agreements through periodic reviews is taken by many including the Nagas themselves as a ploy of the GOI to buy time in order to bury the peace process under the wrap of time.

The NSCN(IM) willingly put forward some demands to the GOI for which they know that it is unacceptable for the Indian Government under the Indian Constitution. These include a separate Constitution of the Nagas under the proposed Nagalim with their own representative to UN, the federal relationship with India only in defence, communication, currency etc. These demands are not palpable to the GOI.

What the Indian Government want most is to solve the Naga problem as that of the Mizoram, Darjeeling or Punjab accord because the country's integrity is paramount and it cannot be compromised. However for a permanent solution to the Naga problem it is indispensable to look beyond the Mizoram or Punjab models. So the GOI instead of giving a point by point answer to the demands of the NSCN(IM), it says that it is willing to resolve the crisis. But this does not satisfy the NSCN(IM).

But why do the two party go into an agreement of ceasefire?

The answers are many. A ceasefire at this stage will give the NSCN(IM) an opportunity to end the long drawn struggle with head held high, who are tired of war and facing a tough time because of India's gaining of the status of a super power and at the same time tired of wearing jungle fatigues and living in the camps or caves in the rain infested NE India.

For the Indian Government, a truce with NSCN(IM) will convey a message to the citizens and other insurgent groups that the State is serious about resolving any crisis.

As the talks progress, it is now clear that NSCN(IM) has given up the demand for a sovereign independent state. They have stuck to their stand that the agenda of discussion with the Centre must be on the unification of all Naga inhabited territories beyond the present State of Nagaland.

In the latest round of talks the NSCN(IM) is understood to have pressed the Indian negotiator that if there are problems to alter the maps of the Present Assam, Manipur and Arunachal Pradesh, that can be left for a later date. But for the present the importance is that India should recognise the desire of the Nagas to live under one roof as legitimate.

However, New Delhi is reluctant to make such commitment because of the serious problems associated with the integration of Naga inhabited areas beyond Nagaland. None of these three States would accept the NSCN(IM)'s demand for the unification of Naga-inhabited areas that fall within their territories.

Then critics are bound to ask 'Why'? After having fought for independence for more than 50 years the sudden volte-face to talk with India and demand for a greater Nagaland under the Indian Constitution causes a considerable loss to the credibility of the NSCN(IM).

If the NSCN(IM) are prepared to live under Indian federation now why they were not prepared to do so decades ago? That would have saved many lives. What is more, a unification of Naga areas which is also Nagas living only in Indian territory (not those living in Myanmar and China) means loyalty to the Indian Constitution. This would mean that NSCN(IM) has given up the demand of independence.

This is a difficult question to answer for the NSCN(IM) at the moment. But the reality is that they have fought for more than 50 years and got nowhere. They may now realise that India cannot concede such a demand of independence because such favour might trigger in the rest of the country. Their bullets have not served their purpose and from their point of view the unification of the Naga-inhabited areas will be a second best solution.

But here, the NSCN(IM) leaders are not doing their home-works well in order to reach a respectable solution in their right. Unless the GOI concedes the NSCN(IM)'s demand for a Greater Nagaland there is little chance of a solution. the GOI has the least authority to diminish even by an inch of the territory of an illegally annexed State like Manipur. Then the only motive of the GOI is to extend the term of the cease fire for another 6 months or 1 year or another 50 years.

In the overall assessment of the peace talks so far, it becomes difficult to claim the process success or failure. No figure directly shows us whether the Nagas get their aspiration under the repeatedly extended ceasefire agreement.

But one fact which is required to remind the Nagas is that the Indo-Naga peace talk is only a tool of the GOI to hammer out an effective strategy to keep the NSCN(IM) in check in the name of peace talk which has been divided into piece talk or periodic talk.