Ethnic separatism : The Kuki-Chin insurgency of Indo-Myanmar/Burma
- Part 4 -

Telsing Letkhosei Haokip *

Kuki National Front (KNF) arms deposition to GOI under SOO on Sept 15 2010 :: Pix - Leivon Jimmy Lamkang

The main impact of the agreement is that by now the revolutionary groups have had to surrender all their weapons and the armory is supposed to be doubled locked by their representatives and the army. The designated camps where they must stay are not located in the immediate vicinity of an international border, highways or villages. The cadres are isolated and kept in virtual confinement. They have to refrain from extorting taxes and fines, kidnapping for ransom, ambushing the police and security personnel.

Significantly, the agreement does not include a clause that forbids militants from killing members of other factions. The direct impact of the agreement on common Kuki people has been that the atmosphere of terror in which they earlier lived has gradually changed and a sense of psychological and physical safety prevails in and around the vicinity of villages and hamlets. Former daily incidents, such as factional fights, kidnapping for ransom, extortions, collection of taxes and other demands, are now almost unheard of.

The Kukis are now anxiously looking forward to progress in political dialogues between the KNO/UPF and the Government.

The valley-based revolutionary groups, having spurned peace talk offers by successive Prime Ministers for decades, are now keeping their fingers crossed while waiting and watching the ongoing developments, though as indicated with increasing frustration. Reports from some reliable valley outfits state that some Kuki militants have joined hands with the army in attacking insurgent camps in inaccessible mountains.

Hypothetically, the NSCN IM faction of the Nagas might be perturbed to see that parts of territory in Ukhrul, Senapati and Tamenglong districts are inhabited by ethnic Kukis, as these areas are a bone of contention for both Kukis and Nagas. Nevertheless, the repeated signing of the Agreement has opened up a new vista and is going to be a landmark in the annals of Kuki history. The revolutionary groups, on their part, vehemently assert that the Kuki Nation which has a distinct ethnic and socio-cultural identity has a right to self determination and to decide their own future, which would be possible only when political autonomy or some form of self-governance is granted within the framework of the Constitution of India. Clearly the stakes are high, and nothing is resolved on the ground at the moment.

Geopolitics and the Indo Myanmar Relationship

Taking a wider view, the pacifying efforts on the Indian side of the international border are probably not unrelated to the wider geopolitical scenario developing in this region. India, the world's largest democratic country, was once a strong critic of the military junta in Burma. Its response to the Burmese coup of 1988 was virulently negative. It was probably the most vociferous critic of Burma until the early 1990s and even employed U Nu's daughter as the head of all India Radio's Burma Service.

India also provides refuge to about 50,000 Burmese dissidents and refugees, of whom about 40,000 are hosted by Mizoram. Dissident Burmese organisations still operate from Indian territory. It is said that George Fernandes, when he was India's Defence Minister (1998-2004), gave shelter to Burmese activists and the All Burma Students operated from his residence in New Delhi.

Meanwhile, the political scenario as well as ecological and commercial concerns have changed the region's geopolitics. The fear psychosis of Myanmar's Military Junta is now being exploited by China, which cannot be in the interest of either India or other democracies of the free world. Realisation that it is important to end Myanmar's isolation and to allay its fears that the whole world is ganging up against it made the Indian Government refocus its Burmese policy. India had never completely forsaken the democracy movement in Myanmar. When Aung San Suu Kyi was released for the second time in May 2002, the Indian government issued a discreet statement cheering her liberation, at the same time showing its trust in the democratic transition efforts of the Myanmar government.

Under the new geopolitics of the region since the early 1990s, India has dropped its general attitude of neglect towards its eastern bordering countries. In 1998 99, Indian foreign policy was still basically focused on the 'Nuclear Issue' and the rivalry with Pakistan. When George Fernandes was first appointed Defense Minister of the NDA Govt in 1998, he became known as one of the fiercest leaders of the anti China campaign, seeing China as 'Enemy Number One' of India.

He stoutly denounced the Chinese influence over the Burmese Junta and accused Beijing of using Yangon's military regime as a spear against India on its eastern flank. When Jaswant Singh took up Foreign Affairs in 1998, he reshaped India's Burmese policy, anchoring a realist approach in South Block. The 'Eastern Strategy' of Jaswant Singh made India gain a foothold in Asia through Myanmar. It appears thus that a combination of ongoing instability in the NE, India's willingness to connect with Southeast Asia and the lurking Chinese threat prompted India to change its policy towards Myanmar.

The India-Myanmar relationship can now be classified broadly into two main perspectives, co operation in developmental projects and trade, plus growing concern about counter-insurgency.

These two policy concerns are evidently connected, since India launched several institutional and development projects through its 'Look East Policy' which would be beneficial to both countries on both counts.

India also chose to get closer to Myanmar through various regional organisations. In fact, the India/Myanmar link is a major bridge between India and all countries comprising the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). According to the Indian Ministry of External Affairs, the first decade of the twenty-first century has witnessed growing strategic engagement between India and Myanmar. As relations with Myanmar have become truly multi faceted, several initiatives followed, including a training centre at Pakokku, set up with India's assistance, and a turbo truck plant at Magway.

As a follow-up, on 5 March 2010, an official Central delegation from Delhi attended a meeting of Border Liaison Officers at Tamu in Myanmar. The delegations not only discussed enhancement of trade relations between India and Myanmar, including a list of trade items, but also strategies to control cross-border traffic and checks on militants' infiltrations along the Indo Myanmar border. This confirms that, apart from developmental projects, India's national and geopolitical interest lies in a strong and stable Myanmar that observes strict neutrality between India and China and cooperates with India in the common fight against various insurgencies raging in both countries' border areas.

Indian and Myanmar forces launched a joint counter-insurgency initiative called 'Operation Golden Bird' in April May 1995. In this arduous joint venture 40 insurgents were killed and a huge arms cache was recovered. In November 2001, Myanmar army staff raided several Manipuri rebel bases, rounded up almost 200 rebels and recovered 1,500 guns. Indo Myanmar co operation is not only essential for counter insurgency, but also aims to control narcotics trafficking and the proliferation of small arms trade. It could also be seen as part of the global War on Terror.

At the same time, some sources report that Burma, like Bangladesh and China, has been hosting Indian insurgent outfits. Therefore, the 'Look East Policy' strategy seems to be applied more intensively to counter insurgency problems. In that context, a two-day meeting of DGPs on 30/31 October 2009 set up a Regional Cooperation Mechanism. The aim of this meeting in Shillong was to increase exchange of information about battalion movements and plans for tackling insurgency outfits among the 7 north eastern states and Sikkim.

In the same spirit, a delegation of India's Ministry of External Affairs raised the issue of north east insurgent groups during a three-day visit to Burma. This started on 10 December 2009 as part of the 12th BIMSTEC ministerial meeting to co operate in combating international terrorism (see note 31). On 22 February 2010, the Home Ministry decided to deploy more BSF battalions along riverine areas of the Bangladesh border and to boost the AR deployment along the Myanmar border.

As part of counter-insurgency measures, delegations of India and Myanmar also discussed the installation of a hotline at the meeting of Border Liaison Officers at Tamu on 5 March 2010. Taking into account the request of the Myanmar delegation, the Home Ministry of India has started the process of providing Boleros, motorbikes and telephones, as well as installing and operating hotlines. Frequent reports claim that insurgents in India's North East are using foreign-made arms procured through smugglers based in Southeast Asia and in Yunnan Province of China, through the Sino Myanmar border and the porous Indo Myanmar border.

A related result of such concerns has been a quite aggressive effort to engage in border fencing between India and Myanmar. Local fieldwork by the author discovered that during summer 2013, in various places, the ongoing construction work of the border fence by the Myanmar army was encroaching on Indian Kuki settlements, including some churches. Numerous Kuki villages are directly affected and a large slice of land one kilometer into Indian territory and ten kilometers long was occupied by Burmese border fencing constructors – significantly, all of this is Kuki territory. NGO reports have confirmed such evidence (Laithangbam, 2013), which has led to growing demand for a re-surveying of the Indo-Myanmar border.

While the Government of India has voiced its concerns over this with the Government of Myanmar, India seems more concerned about controlling the North East insurgent groups than protecting its territorial integrity, while Myanmar requires the assistance and support of India for implementing development work in Myanmar. Since in all these new developments, Kukis are again becoming victims, in this case through surreptitious ceding of their territory to Myanmar by India, new anger is emerging and the situation is becoming increasingly dangerous again, especially in the affected border areas.

To be continued...