Ethnic separatism : The Kuki-Chin insurgency of Indo-Myanmar/Burma
- Part 3 -

Telsing Letkhosei Haokip *

Kuki National Front (KNF) arms deposition to GOI under SOO on Sept 15 2010 :: Pix - Leivon Jimmy Lamkang

Retrospect of Mizoram Accord of 1986

After Rajiv Gandhi had become Prime Minister of India in 1984, he met the leader of the MNF, Laldenga, on 15 February 1985 to explore the possibilities of a negotiated settlement. The outcome of this meeting, the so-called Mizoram Peace Accord, was signed between the MNF and the Union Government of India on 30 June 1986. Achievement of statehood was a prerequisite of the Accord, so that Mizoram became a federal state of India soon thereafter, on 20 February 1987 (Fredholm, 1993: 181). Laldenga's underground movement was now legalised and allowed to participate in free elections after surrendering their weapons and separatist demands.

However, this meant that the earlier resolution adopted for a Kuki-Mizo state or Greater Mizoram of the Kawnpui Convention of 1965, attended by 13 tribe-based organisations of Kuki-Chin people of Manipur state, had remained unfulfilled (Haokip, 2010: 37). While there was a joyous celebration of Mizoram statehood in Mizoram, in Manipur, Nagaland, Assam and Burma, many scholars, activists and community leaders of the Kuki-Chin family, other than Lushai speakers, considered the accord as a curse for the unity and integrity of the whole Kuki-Chin ethnic group.

One major reason behind this is that Lushai speakers/Mizos are the largest among the 45 tribes of the Kuki-Chin family. Leaving behind their minor cousin tribes by surrendering the previous demands and causes and opting for a smaller Mizoram created further social and political fragmentation in the Kuki-Chin extended family.

It has been argued that apart from the British colonial regime, which had separated the Kuki-Chin people among different international boundaries, Laldenga, instead of putting together his scattered people, betrayed them and left them behind in darkness at his own Gates of Triumph. Today, many critical observers see that Laldenga's myopic political sight blurred the future of his cousin tribes, resulting in suppression and persecution of Kukis in the states of Manipur, Assam and Nagaland, especially during the 1990s by separatists, mainly Nagas.

Notably, the National Socialist Council of Nagaland (NSCN-IM) killed 968 innocent Kukis, uprooting 360 villages and rendering 50,000 refugees in their own ancestral land. Manipur valley-based militants have also more recently caused havoc in areas inhabited by the Kukis, killing, injuring and disabling many people, mainly women, children and elderly persons (Haokip, 2010: 36). The Kukis, this meant, clearly had to resort to self-defense.

Emergence of Various Kuki-Chin Insurgent Groups

Initially, the attainment of Mizoram statehood by the MNF not only frustrated but also greatly inspired the Kuki-Chins, at first especially in Burma. Within 3-4 months, on 20 June 1987, the Zomi Liberation Front (ZLF) was formed to strive for a free state for the Zomis in Burma, as done by the MNF for the Mizos. On 18 May 1988, another organisation, called Kuki National Front (KNF) was raised by the late Nehlun Kipgen at Molnoi village in Burma, attended by Kuki leaders and elders from India and Burma. KNF was formed to carve out an autonomous Kukiland under the Constitution of India (Kipgen, 1989). However, due to internal leadership crisis the KNF soon broke into two, the KNF President Group (KNF-P) and the KNF-T Samuel group known as (KNF-S), both fronts actively functioning in their respective area of operations.

Subsequently, on 24 February 1989, an Indian-based Myanmar Movement called Kuki National Army (KNA), attended by Kuki leaders and chiefs from India and Burma, was founded under the initiation and leadership of Thangkholun Haokip at Molvailup village of Ukhrul district, Manipur near the Indo-Myanmar border. He was made the first Commander-in-Chief of the newly formed outfit. The KNA strove for the creation of a separate state for the Kukis inclusive of both 'old Kukis and New Kukis' (Gangte, 1993: 35), to be carved out from all Kuki-inhabited regions of India and Burma.

That this would be opposed, also since it affects international borders, was clear from the outset. An overground wing of this outfit, the Kuki National Organisation (KNO) was then formed in 2000 and P.S. Haokip was elected as President of KNO/KNA. Since the formation of this overground KNO wing, KNO/ KNA have offered the suggestion that if amalgamation of parts of India and Burma is problematic for the concerned state authorities, two Kuki states, one within India and another within Burma, should be created. At present, KNO/KNA is an India-based movement working in both countries. As indicated at the start of this article, and discussed further below, KNO has been part of the peace agreement with the Indian authorities.

Impacts of the Suspension of Operation Agreements since 2005

To reiterate, on 1 August 2005, a total of 19 Kuki revolutionary outfits under the umbrellas of the KNO and the UPF signed an Agreement about 'Suspension of Operation' with the Indian Army. This meant that with immediate effect, a large number of Kuki revolutionary/insurgency organisations operating in the state of Manipur agreed to lay down their weapons and to engage in political dialogue. Then, on 22 August 2008 a tripartite Agreement between the Government of India, the Government of Manipur and the KNO/UPF was signed in New Delhi.

As a formal result of this Agreement, meetings of a Joint Monitoring Group have been held at various times, involving key stakeholders such as the KNO/UPF, representatives of the Police, the Army, Assam Rifles (AR), Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF), Border Security Force (BSF) and leading officials of the Union Home Ministry and the state government of Manipur.

Meanwhile, however, increasing disquiet has been reported from among the insurgent groups that are party to this Agreement, mainly about lack of progress in negotiations. There is growing dissatisfaction that Kuki political issues are being neglected by the Centre, while more progress seems to be made in parallel negotiations with Naga groups, who are subject to similar holding agreements and are pushing hard for their agenda. When a KNO/UPF delegation went to Delhi in early 2014 expressing such disquiet, it received assurances that relevant discussions would be initiated soon.

The Kuki groups then withdrew their boycott plans, only to find that in the 2014 elections, the local Congress candidate retained his seat, while the NDA government lost power and there is now a BJP-led government in Delhi. Dr. Seilen Haokip, spokesperson of the KNO, has been saying that they are closely observing how the newly installed Modi-led NDA government perceives the Kuki issue. He expressed hope that the NDA government would deliver more progress than the earlier UPA Congress government and would not treat the signing of the pact, every time it expires, merely as a perfunctory exercise.

The latest position at the time of completing this article is that after the 2014 Parliamentary elections, the Kuki groups, threatening to boycott the continuation of the Agreement, stepped up their publicity campaigns to highlight atrocities against their community. On 4 July 2014, the Kuki Inpi Manipur (KIM), the apex body of Kuki tribes, held a state-wide protest rally to demand justice for the terror victims of the 1990s, drawing attention to the unaddressed plight of the victimised Kukis.

In this context it is significant that frequent references to the fundamental rights guarantees of the Indian Constitution were made, as well as addressing Memoranda to all relevant office bearers at central and state level in India as well as the United Nations, the National Human Rights Commission of India and the Chief Ministers of all 7 North Eastern states of India (The Sangai Express, 2014).

Then, after several last-minute meetings, and despite misgivings on the part of the KNO/UPF, on 22 August 2014 in New Delhi, a formal extension of this Agreement for another year was signed by the new BJP Government of India, the government of Manipur and the KNO/UPF. However, there is still no concrete decision about when focused political dialogue would start and what form it will take. Ongoing fieldwork by the author finds many verbal assurances from several leading politicians, but the KNO/OPF have heard this all before and remain distrustful. Local evidence suggests that the situation on the ground is again becoming tense.

Initially, the SoO agreements of 2005 and 2008 between the KNO/UPF and the Governments of India and of Manipur had far-reaching impacts on all sections of people in the state, particularly the Kuki people. At the time of the initial agreement, all members of the KNO, both armed cadres and overground members, numbered around 800, while the UPF had about 1.000 cadres. Under the terms of the Agreement, the Government of India would pay a monthly stipend/allowance of Rs. 3,000 each for armed cadres and Rs. 5,000 for leaders as incentives to abide by the Agreement.

The KNO was given to understand that there would be two designated camps at Churachandpur, one at Ukhrul and two in Chandel District, whereas the UPF was promised six designated camps, two in Sadar Hills, three in Churachandpur and one in Chandel District respectively. Meanwhile, a lot of money has been spent on these camps, but not only journalists are reporting that their occupants are frustrated and increasingly dissatisfied (Unnithan & Deka, 2012: 22).

To be continued...