Two years of Ethnic Unrest: A Challenge to India's National Security Framework
Ksh. Armstrong Singh *
The ethnic conflict between the Meitei and Kuki communities, which began on May 3rd, 2023, has now persisted for nearly two years. While the prevailing narrative attributes to the protests over the Meiteis’ demand for Scheduled Tribe status, the underlying causes are far more complex and rooted in deeper tensions. According to several local observers, security analysts, and media reports the immediate triggers of the conflict are closely associated to the state government’s “War on Drugs,” campaign commenced on November 3, 2018.
This initiative lead to evict illegal encroachers from Reserved and Protected Forests, and the detection of undocumented immigrants in areas like Churachandpur and Moreh (both Kuki dominated areas). These actions directly threatened the interests of drug cartels, Kuki militants, and certain political actors with vested interests. In March and April 2023, forest offices and public infrastructure including an open gym in Churachandpur were reportedly set ablaze by armed Kuki groups, signalling early resistance to the government’s crackdown.
Further inflaming tensions were instances of land encroachment and coercion by Kuki underground groups, who allegedly issued “quit notices” to Meitei villages situated in foothill areas, alongside disruptions at sacred pilgrimage sites such as Mount Koubru in Kangpokpi and Mount Thangjing in Churachandpur. These actions provoked widespread anger and a sense of existential threat among the Meitei community.
On May 3, 2023, the All Tribal Students’ Union Manipur (ATSUM) organized rallies across several hill district headquarters, including Senapati, Ukhrul, Kamjong, and Tamenglong, which concluded peacefully. However, violence erupted in Churachandpur that same evening following a rally and public meeting. Subsequently, in an unprovoked attack, approximately 1,000 homes belonging to Meiteis were torched by the Kuki protester supported by the Armed Suspension of Operation militants.
In response, Meitei youths and volunteers from the Arambai Tengol (a cultural organization), began retaliatory actions on May 4th and 5th 2023, which they continue to describe as defensive measures aimed at protecting their communities from what they term narco-terror elements allegedly supported by international drug syndicates and armed Kuki-Chin groups linked to Myanmar’s militants.
The ongoing conflict, therefore, is not just an ethnic confrontation but a broader battle involving criminal networks, insurgency, and territorial control, all of which have critical implications for India’s national security.
Over 220 people were killed, more than 60000 people were displaced, and ethnic enclaves turned into battlegrounds. For a security point of view, this crisis represents a complex case of state failure, ethno-political fragmentation, and systemic security collapse.
The situation was compounded by an administrative and intelligence failure. Despite visible signs of tension and mobilization, the state’s security apparatus remained ill-prepared. Police stations were looted, and over 4,000 weapons fell into the hands of mobs and ethnic militias. The delayed deployment of central paramilitary forces allowed the conflict to spiral beyond control, damaging the credibility of both the state and central government.
What makes the Manipur crisis a national security issue rather than a mere law-and-order problem is the strategic geography of the state. Sharing a 398 km-long border with Myanmar, Manipur’s borderlands are historically porous and poorly guarded. The now-defunct Free Movement Regime (FMR), introduced in 1950 and later amended in 2018, allowed tribal communities living within 16 km on either side of the Indo-Myanmar border to cross without passports or visas.
While it preserved age-old cultural and economic ties, this regime was increasingly misused by insurgents and traffickers. Cross-border insurgent camps, especially in Myanmar’s Sagaing and Chin regions, have long served as sanctuaries for groups. Additionally, the drug trade, especially heroin and methamphetamine from the Golden Triangle, has flourished via routes running through Churachandpur, Ukhrul, and Moreh.
Amid the Manipur crisis, intelligence agencies reported increased insurgent movement and the reactivation of sleeper cells. Recognizing the potential for cross-border destabilization, the Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA) officially scrapped the FMR on January 2, 2024, few months after the violence was erupted on 3rd May 2023. This strategic move was aimed at reasserting control over the borders, curbing illegal arms and narcotics flow, and checking the infiltration of foreign insurgents under the guise of refugees.
However, the scrapping of the FMR has not been without serious repercussions. Tribal councils, civil society organizations, and the state governments of Nagaland and Mizoram have openly opposed the move, citing its adverse impact on indigenous communities residing along the Indo-Myanmar border.
The Khiamniungan Tribal Council (KTC) and groups like NSCN/GPRN (Khango-Hokato Vusshe) have strongly opposed the border fencing and revocation of FMR, calling it an attack on indigenous cultural unity and accusing the Centre of ignoring ground. For these communities, the FMR was not merely a logistical allowance, it was a means of preserving long-standing cultural, familial, and economic ties. Its abrupt termination has intensified feelings of alienation and political marginalization among borderland tribes.
The situation has been further compounded by the steady influx of refugees from Myanmar following the February 2021 military coup. This migration has led to a visible demographic shift in Manipur’s hill districts, heightening anxieties among the Meitei population in the valley, many of whom have begun to demand the implementation of a National Register of Citizens (NRC)-like exercise to safeguard their “indigenous” status.
This perceived demographic insecurity has fuelled the rise of armed vigilante groups in the valley, some of whom have been accused of extortion, harassment, and illegal activities under the guise of protecting Meitei interests.
Meanwhile, in the hills, reports suggest that cadres of Kuki insurgent groups under the SoO agreement have violated ground rules, with some allegedly collaborating with Myanmarese insurgents. Incidents of gunfire directed at civilians in the valley, lead to increase hostilities and armed standoffs across multiple districts. These developments illustrate the rapidly deteriorating security environment and the growing challenge of maintaining peace in an already volatile region.
This erosion of the state’s monopoly on violence, the arming of civilians and the ethnicization of security forces mark a dangerous trend toward localized militancy. For any democratic nation, such developments are red flags of regional instability and potential civil conflict.
The prolonged internet shutdown in the state, one of the longest in recent history aimed to curb the spread of misinformation but also created an information vacuum, enabling the circulation of fake narratives and unverified claims. From a national security standpoint, this blackout hindered relief efforts, limited accountability, and damaged India’s international image as a democratic state capable of managing internal dissent.
The New Delhi’s efforts to regain control have included troop reinforcements, talks with community leaders, and reassessment of border policies. Yet, these responses have been largely reactive rather than pre-emptive. The real challenge lies not just in restoring order but in preventing recurrence. The way forward must begin with an immediate and comprehensive arms recovery program, with both coercive and incentivized measures.
Simultaneously, fencing the Indo-Myanmar border must be prioritized, but with diplomatic sensitivity to tribal identities and humanitarian concerns. At the administrative level, district-level joint coordination centers involving civil, police, and military officials must be established to address future ethnic flare-ups swiftly.
Beyond tactical responses, long-term peace in Manipur and the larger Northeast depends on building a more inclusive federal framework. A permanent truth and reconciliation commission should be set up to address ethnic grievances and historical injustices. Development must be conflict-sensitive, focusing on equitable infrastructure, education, and healthcare across both valley and hill regions.
The government must also invest in early warning systems leveraging AI tools, community informant networks, and media monitoring to detect early signs of ethnic polarization and mobilization.
Manipur has become a grim reminder of what happens when a state’s security mechanisms fail to respond to socio-political signals. It is also a warning that ethnic conflicts, once ignited, can tear the national fabric if not managed through a combination of strategic foresight and empathetic governance as it is seen today.
The Northeast, while geographically remote, is geopolitically central to India’s Act East Policy, its defence posture against China, and its regional integration strategy. A burning Manipur endangers all of that. Only then can the wounds of Manipur begin to heal, and only then can India truly claim to be united in diversity.
Manipur’s fire may be localized, but its smoke clouds the national conscience. India cannot afford to look away. The northeastern frontier, rich in culture but fragile in peace must be guarded not just by fences and firearms, but by a resilient architecture of trust, justice, and inclusive security.
In conclusion, Manipur’s tragedy must be more than a headline. It must be a turning point for national security thinking in India. The region’s security cannot be viewed through a purely military or intelligence lens as it must include cultural respect, administrative reform, and sustainable peacebuilding.
Hence it is a high time for India to seek for a permanent solution that protect sovereignty without sacrificing dignity, and for borders that secure, not separate.
* Ksh. Armstrong Singh wrote this article for e-pao.net
The writer is a Student of National Security Studies
and can be reached at armsmayum(AT)gmail(DOT)com
This article was webcasted on April 26 2025.
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