The Mahar Regiment incident and the strategic erosion of State authority in Manipur
- From Camouflage to Capitulation -

HR Singh *

The Mahar Regiment incident at Gwaltabi on 20 May 2025 :: Picture Courtery - TSE

On a seemingly ordinary stretch of highway between Imphal and Ukhrul, a disturbing incident recently took place that starkly illuminates the crumbling Constitutional and strategic authority of the Indian State in its North Eastern frontier.

Members of the Mahar Regiment, deployed ostensibly for public protection during the State-sponsored Shirui Lily Festival, reportedly asked media professionals to cover the word `Manipur'—the name of the State itself—on a public transport vehicle, fearing attacks from Kuki militants who had issued open warnings to Meiteis about crossing their self-designated zones.

While appearing on the surface as a tactical safety measure, this incident has exposed a National crisis of governance, military neutrality, and political will in Manipur. It is no longer just a local ethnic conflict—it is a systemic unraveling of India's sovereign authority in the region.

I. Military to Conceal the State's Name: A Crisis of Symbolism and Substance

Military operations in restive areas always involve a balance between aggression and restraint. But when an army, deployed in aid of civil authority, instructs civilians to erase the identity of the very State it is meant to protect, it is no longer restraint—it is strategic abdication. By asking to cover the name "Manipur," the Mahar Regiment's action:

1) Legitimized the militant claim that Manipur's State apparatus has no jurisdiction beyond the valley.
2) Undermined the psychological strength of the Indian State's presence in the hills.
3) Handed symbolic victory to militant forces who now see that threats yield compliance even from armed institutions. This is not a war-zone response. It is a capitulation dressed in uniform.

II. The Indian Army and the Perception of Partisanship

For many Meiteis and hill communities alike, the army's actions reinforce a growing perception of partisanship. There is widespread public belief that Indian security forces are treating Kuki militant assertions with undue leniency, while local resistance or demands by other communities, be they Meitei or Tangkhul, are met with stricter scrutiny or indifference. This is not without precedent.

In Sri Lanka, during the early stages of the Tamil conflict, military neutrality was compromised when certain segments of the armed forces were seen as aligned with Sinhalese interests. The result was catastrophic—a full-blown civil war.

The key lesson: perception of bias in military conduct in multi-ethnic zones leads to radicalization and distrust, not peace. Similarly, in Rwanda (1994), the inaction and selective complicity of National security institutions in the face of ethnic threats signaled green lights to extremist groups. The international principle established post-Rwanda was that State neutrality in the face of ethnic cleansing threats is not a tactical compromise but a moral failure.

Ill. Delhi's Silence : Abandonment as Policy

Perhaps the most damning element of this episode is the complete silence of the Indian Prime Minister on the Meitei-Kuki conflict, even as violence continues, populations are displaced, and civil society fragments. When heads of State maintain a studied silence during civil unrest, it is usually due to :

1. Willful disengagement – a belief that the conflict is peripheral and self-containing.
2. Covert strategy – allowing the conflict to unfold in a controlled fashion to realign power structures.
3. Lack of a coherent internal policy for ethnic conflict in the North East. In this case, all three seem applicable.

It is telling that no Central condemnation was issued against the open threats from Kuki groups warning Meiteis not to travel across their zones. These threats were not secret. They were public. Yet, the Indian State responded with silence, not security.

IV. Possible Nexus: Realpolitik or Ethical Betrayal ?

There is growing speculation that India's informal alliances with anti-junta forces in Myanmar, particularly the People's Defence Force (PDF) and the National Unity Government (NUG), who have strong ties with Kuki-Zomi ethnic groups, have influenced the internal tolerance of Kuki militant activity.

This theory is not baseless. As India seeks to counter China's growing influence in Myanmar and secure its eastern front, it may see Kuki groups as strategic intermediaries. But this geopolitical calculation comes at a devastating domestic cost:

I) It weakens trust in Indian institutions among Meiteis and Nagas.
2) It undermines India's credibility in its own democratic federalism.
3) It rewards extraconstitutional militancy as a means of bargaining.

It is reminiscent of Pakistan's handling of tribal militias in Waziristan, where State complicity with certain groups led to longterm fragmentation and blowback. If India continues on this path, the North East risks becoming its own Afghanistan-in-the-making.

V. The Collapse of the Rule of Law: A Highway Held Hostage

That National Highways in the State can be routinely blocked, patrolled, and controlled by militants without immediate military reprisal or political condemnation is not just a law-and-order issue. It is a territorial fragmentation of the Indian Republic. The doctrine of "Freedom of Movement" under Article 19 (1)(d) of the Indian Constitution is non-negotiable.

Any group that threatens or curtails this freedom through intimidation or violence should be automatically treated as a terror organization under the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act (IJAPA). Yet no such action has been taken.

Compare this to Spain's handling of Catalan separatists: while allowing democratic processes for autonomy, any attempt to enforce territorial control through coercion is swiftly curtailed by Central forces. In India, the reverse is playing out—militant threats are met with tactical camouflage and institutional retreat.

Conclusion: The State Cannot Be Defended with Hidden Names

The Mahar Regiment may have acted under immediate operational constraints, but their decision to hide & 'Manipur' was symbolic of a broader collapse of assertiveness, clarity, and Constitutional presence. The Indian State today is protecting Manipur by hiding it. But a State that hides cannot defend. And a Nation that cannot defend its peripheries is only as strong as its next insurrection.

India must recalibrate its military neutrality, reclaim symbolic and territorial spaces, and rebuild institutional trust—not with silence and strategy, but with public will, Constitutional firmness, and unequivocal defense of civil rights.

Manipur does not need camouflage. It needs courage.