Geopolitics and the fate of Manipur

Haorokcham Anil *

Geopolitics and the fate of Manipur :: Pix - TSE

India has a long-standing unresolved border dispute with China in the Himalayan region, particularly over Aksai Chin, which India considers part of Jammu and Kashmir. This claim is based on the Johnson Line (1865), drawn by surveyor William Johnson and later endorsed by John Charles Ardagh as the official boundary of India.

However, China rejected this boundary, instead claiming Aksai Chin as a part of its Xinjiang province, according to the McDonald Line proposed by the British Empire in 1893. China currently controls much of the region under what is called the “Line of Actual Control” (LAC).

The violent clashes in the strategically important Galwan Valley on June 15, 2020, resulting in casualties on both sides, were a consequence of this ongoing territorial dispute. To this day, the boundary between the two Nations remains a point of contention.

The border dispute extends beyond the western Himalayas to the eastern sector, where China claims the Indian State of Arunachal Pradesh as a part of South Tibet. This claim challenges the McMahon Line, which India recognizes as the official boundary. The region has also become a significant flashpoint in India-China relations.

The Chinese incursions of 1962 at Arunachal Pradesh and Aksai Chin underscore the volatility of these disputed areas. This threat was further highlighted by the 2017 Doklam standoff near the Siliguri Corridor, a strategically vital region for India. Known as the “Chicken Neck”, this narrow strip of land is only about 20 km wide and 60 km long, connecting the North Eastern States to the rest of India.

Its geo-strategic importance is amplified by its proximity to Nepal in the northwest, Bangladesh to the south, and Bhutan to the northeast. The presence of Chinese military forces just 130 km away in Tibet’s Chumbi Valley, within the range of Chinese artillery, heightens the vulnerabilities of the area.

Given China’s unpredictable behavior in disputed territories, exemplified by the 1962 incursion, India has recognized the need for an alternative route to ensure continued connectivity with its North Eastern States in case of conflict at the Chicken Neck preventing North East India from being cut off from the mainland that will create two blocks like the erstwhile West and East Pakistan.

This concern has driven the development of the Kaladan Multi-Modal Transit Transport Project apart from facilitating NER region access to the Indian Ocean for economic boost.

Some believe, the Kaladan project is one the reasons for the ethnic violence that erupted on May 3, 2023, between the Meitei and Kuki communities in Manipur although it may not account as the direct cause. The Government’s appeasement of certain groups or communities to safeguard the project’s interests has been questioned.

Factors such as large-scale deforestation by the Kuki community, the influx of illegal immigrants from Myanmar’s Chin province, the destruction of poppy cultivation by the Manipur State Government, and narco-terrorism have all contributed to tensions and the ensuing violence.

Moreover, opposition from tribal communities, particularly the Kuki, against the directive of the Hon’ble Manipur High Court to the Government of Manipur to send the sought socio-economic report for inclusion of the Meitei/Meetei community in the Scheduled Tribe (ST) list further fuelled the conflict.

The Kaladan Multi-Modal Transit Transport Project, part of India’s Act East Policy, passes through the strife torn regions of Rakhine (Arakan) and Chin State in western Myanmar. These areas are home to Ethnic Armed Organizations (EAOs) that oppose Myanmar’s military junta, seeking greater autonomy and democratic reforms. The 110 km roadway section of the project, from Paletwa to Zorinpui on the India-Myanmar border in Mizoram, traverses the Chin State, where the Kuki-Chin and Chin EAOs are the influential groups.

India’s geopolitical interests in the region include safeguarding the Kaladan project and countering Chinese influence. China has invested heavily in the Kyaukpyu Deep Sea Port, part of the China-Myanmar Economic Corridor (CMEC) under its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI).

Located about 75 km south of India’s Sittwe Port (developed as part of the Kaladan project), Kyaukpyu offers China an alternative route to the Malacca Straits and the South China Sea, bypassing several strategic choke points.

The competition between India and China in this region is now evident, with both Nations seeking to strengthen ties with the local populace for strategic advantages. For India, maintaining good relations with the Kuki-Chin people is vital for the success of the project if the threat looming at the Chicken Neck is pertinent.

The strategic relationship with the locals is also required for projects like the India-Myanmar-Thailand (IMT) Trilateral Highway, which spans 1,360 km and originates from Mae Sot (Thailand) passing through Myawaddy, Bago, Mandalay, Tamu (Myanmar) and entering India through Moreh is an important component of India’s Act East policy to connect with ASEAN through road connectivity. It is also important to note that this important IMT Trilateral Highway passes through Chin State of Myanmar.

In Manipur, the Kuki community, originally brought by the British in the early 19th century, has been seeking geographic, demographic and political dominance, through illegal immigration mainly from Myanmar’s Chin State.

This, combined with the State’s Scheduled Tribe (ST) status for “Any Kuki tribe” and the influx of funds from poppy cultivation and narco-terrorism, has led to challenges against the “Idea of Manipur” which have more than 2000 plus years of history and well-defined territorial boundary when merged to the Union of India on 15th October, 1949.

The strong demand for a “Separate Administration” for the Kuki-Chin people in the State of Manipur following the incitement of violence on the Meitei community on 3rd May 2023 with an ulterior motive is seen as a part of a long-standing agenda.

Given these dynamics, a critical question remains: “Are we willing to risk the destruction of Manipur to secure the broader interests of North East India through the appeasement of a particular community?”