Effective Unified Command approach towards conflict resolution in Manipur

Brigadier (Retd) L Ibotombi Singh *

One of the suggested changes is to adopt Unified Command at the strategic level headed by the Chief Minister, as was adopted in Assam and Jammu & Kashmir; and one at operational level, headed preferably by GOC 3 Corps. Under the existing arrangement of governance in Manipur, no significant roles have been given to the Chief Minister for effective and optimal use of the Security Forces as he is not at the helm in exercising Unified Command.

The Centre needs to have confidence towards Chief Minister of a State, as he/she is elected as per Article 164 of the Constitution. Sidelining the Manipur Chief Minister under the existing Unified Command approach is a slap on the face of 29 lakh people. The Centre must not see which person is the Chief Minister of Manipur, whether he/she is a Meitei or Naga or Zo-Kuki or Metei Pangal; instead see it as an Institution as he/she represents entire population of Manipur, elected as per the Constitution.

Manipur has been grappling with endless violence between armed groups in the Kuki-Zo-chin dominated hill districts and the Meitei-dominated districts in the plains nearly for two years. The unprecedented violence and turmoil have affected many aspects of society in Manipur. The unfortunate ongoing conflict in Manipur was planned much before the Manipur High Court Order (directing the State Government to recommend Meitei's inclusion in the ST list) and its protest demonstration on May 3, 2023.

In truth, the High Court’s directives were used as a façade or an excuse to execute their well-planned and coordinated mayhems so as to destabilise North East in general and Manipur in particular. The reasons as to why the invisible hands created mayhem in Manipur were
(a) intense crackdown against narco-terrorism during 2021-23,
(b) implementation of ILP in Manipur thereby restrictions against illegal migrants from Myanmar and other regions,
(c) crackdown against illegal encroachment and establishments of villages in Reserved Forests, other forests and Government lands primarily harbouring illegal migrants from Myanmar over many years,
(d) prevention and destructions of poppy plantations which shifted over 15 years from golden triangle to hill region of Manipur neighbouring Myanmar
(e) streamlining of border trade, with prevention and crackdown against illegal trading from Myanmar and vice versa from Manipur,
(f) loud chorus for implementation of NRC from the public and lastly
(f) shifting of Kuki insurgent SoO Camps which earlier were surrounding Imphal valley.

Besides 250 killed and 1500 injured, the ongoing violence has made around 65 thousand Internally Displaced Personnel (IDPs), some of them spread over to other parts of the region, thereby affecting the economic and social fabrics of the State. Apart from the halting of almost all economic activity; education and transport and communication are the most severely impacted sectors by the prolonged bloodshed, which has lasted nearly two years.

The Manipur economy will take 20 to 30 years to return to its pre-May 2023 levels. Despite all the difficulties and hardships mentioned above, the two communities are still at loggerheads, disregarding the long historical ties and symbiotic relationship between them. A close examination reveals that the two communities are not at war, but individuals with an agenda, incited by invisible hands.

Thus, invisible hands are in play, not one; but many invisible hands are involved in this conflict. Whenever there is some semblance of normalcy, these phantom hands incite violence and are continually attempting to destabilise Manipur and North East Region (NER), including those from beyond the international border.

In this complex conflict and ethnic divide, it is the invisible hands who are using the blind pawns as a means to capitalise and politicise, thereby achieve their end state. They like to keep the pot boiling at right temperature. Now is the time for the three pillars of Indian Constitution, the Executive, the Legislature and the Judiciary, to make all-out efforts to unveil the mastermind in the ongoing violence in Manipur.

The NSA with his ancillaries’ agencies must take it as a challenge to find these invisible hands, including those from outside the country and reveal it in public domain. Notwithstanding a-three-member Judicial inquiry headed by former Chief Justice of Guwahati High Court, Ajai Lamba, set up since June 03, 2023; there is an urgent requirement to prepare a White Paper by the State Government which must include the reasons leading to May 03, 2023 violence and afterwards, lapses, the response by the security forces and other agencies and recommendations to avoid such unfortunate ugly incidents in Manipur.

Despite on ground presence of 43000 boots (Army, Assam Rifles, BSF and CRPF) from the Central Forces and 40000 boots (Manipur Rifles, IRB, Village Defence Forces and Home Guards) from the State forces, it appears that no significant effort has been made to douse the flame so far.

Both the state and the centre appear to have left both the warring groups to their fates, waiting for conflict theory's “hurting stalemate situation,” leaving the warring groups to fight to the extent that the conflict automatically de-escalates when both parties are completely exhausted and unable to intensify the fight as nothing is left to fight for any further.

The sporadic recurrence of violent attacks has led to the civilian population doubting the capacity of 83000 boots to protect them from armed attacks. This explains their trust in village volunteers for the protection of their lives and properties. This mindset needs to be changed. The security forces’ success in preventing the recurrence of violent incidents is critical to reversing the situation.

As a result, citizens are confused about who is responsible for law and order: the State Government, the Central Government, or the citizens themselves. For example, the Ministry of Home Affairs recently stated that the Jiribam tragedy, in which six women and toddlers were kidnapped and killed, is a matter of “maintenance of law and order,” that falls under the State Government’s responsibility.

On the other side, the Chief Minister is unable to relocate even a few troops of 65000 additional boots as per threat analysis as he is not head of the Unified Command and has no authority to do so.

While examining the role of Security Forces under the Unified Command and the Political Will towards conflict resolution of the ongoing conflict, both have failed to bring conflict resolution in the State. The onus of failure, at present, is slightly titled towards the Security Forces, considering presence of 83000 mammoth size boots in the State.

The primary role of the security forces is to shape the environment free from violence to facilitate political dialogue between the two warring communities ie Meiteis and Zo-Kukis. Efficacy of the present Unified Command is under clouds considering the knee-jerk reactive responses towards violent conflicts example being spread of the ethnic violence in Jiribam District, despite clear warning given to the Unified Command in January 2024.

Equally is lack of political will towards resolution of conflict in Manipur. The public is confused whether Article 355 or 356 has been invoked in Manipur, for all decisions on internal security matters are initiated by the Ministry of Home, under the directions of Union Home Minister. Example being exclusion of Chief Minister of Manipur, while reviewing security situation chaired by the Union Home Minister. The present situation in Manipur as controlled from the Centre, is like having HYBRID Article 355 and 356, as all im- portant decisions are taken by the Central Government in running the State.

Effective Unified Command Approach : Conflict resolution is an art, which require a strong political will, combined with shaping a conducive environment by the security forces. In the case of Manipur, despite having 83000 boots on ground, the existing Unified Command has not given any tangible results for facilitating dialogues between the two warring communities.

Therefore, it is the right time to restructure and change the approach towards the Unified Command before nothing is left to protect for, if we wait for the conflict fatigue. The primary role of the Unified Command will be to facilitate conflict resolution and NOT repeat NOT counter insurgency. One of the suggested changes is to adopt Unified Command at the strategic level headed by the Chief Minister, as was adopted in Assam and Jammu & Kashmir, if the Centre’s stand about “Manipur is not under Article 355 or 356 is true”.

Simultaneously, have another Unified Command at the operational level, for synergised application of all boots deployed in Manipur, preferably headed by the General Officer Commanding 3 Corps. For this, tactical Headquarters of 3 Corps can be shifted to Imphal, for better command and control. Under the present arrangement of governance in Manipur, no significant roles have been given to the Chief Minister for effective and optimal use of the Security Forces as he is not at the helm in exercising Unified Command.

The Centre needs to have confidence towards Chief Minister of a State, as he/she is elected as per Article 164 of the Constitution. Sidelining the Manipur Chief Minister under the existing Unified Command approach is a slap on the face of 29 lakh people (as per 2011 census). The Centre must not see which person is the Chief Minister of Manipur, whether he/she is a Meitei or Naga or Zo-Kuki or Meitei Pangal; instead see it as an Institution as he/she represents entire population of Manipur, elected as per the Constitution.

The Strategic Command headed by the Chief Minister will facilitate application of synergised security forces and other agencies in conflict management and initiation of political dialogue to resolve the present impasse. The Unified Commander at operational level will be de facto security advisor to the Chairperson Unified Command at strategic level.

The most important mandate of the Unified Command will be creation of conducive atmosphere for initiation of political dialogues which involves disarmament, stringent enforcement of cease fire ground rules, preventing flow of weapons and warlike stores from Myanmar into Manipur, thereby bring the level of violence down. Thus, clear cut mandate is a pre-requisite, which will include rules of engagement for the security forces. This arrangement can be made for six months and reviewed accordingly. Some of the recommended key focused areas for the unified are: -

(a) Disarmament and Dynamic Deployment : The most important tasks of the Commander Unified Command at operational level is disarmament. This needs synergized efforts and is the foremost important tasks. Without this, the present crisis will prolong. Besides recovery operations, encourage surrender of arms, give incentives for which the Centre must help the State financially. There should no undue political interference as how these 83000 boots are going to be utilised, example being a free hand given to General (later Field Marshal) SHFJ Manekshaw during 1971 Indo-Pak War.

The fact that illegal arms in the possession of armed civilian groups and terrorists’ outfits are continuing to blaze in the State speaks volumes about the unfinished task of restoring peace. Armed groups have been using unarmed civilians as shields to resist the recovery of illegal weapons, due to which security forces are wary of collateral damage to innocent civilians.

Any collateral damage will only precipitate the situation, allowing invisible hands to exploit the situation. Disarming armed groups both in the hills and the plains without the support of unarmed civilians is a daunting task. Security forces winning the trust of unarmed civilian groups and civils society organisations is a must to achieve success in their operation to seize every single illegal arm in possession of armed miscreants in the State.

This will require the forces to ensure adequate security in each violence-hit village by thwarting attacks by armed miscreants. Deploying strong security pickets and simultaneously intensifying area domination in surrounding areas of vulnerable villages will boost the confidence of the inmates of the relief camps to return to their villages.

(b) Border Sealing : Besides fencing, to be completed on a war footing, Indo-Myanmar border must be sealed by physical presence of troops to prevent flow of weapons from Myanmar as most of the Indo-Myanmar border are now under control of various warring Myanmar’s ethnic groups. Simultaneously, the security forces intensifying vigil against the infiltration of anti-Indian elements in Myanmar into the troubled State and the three other bordering States of Mizoram, Nagaland, and Arunachal Pradesh is essential to prevent such elements from posing an internal security threat in the North East region.

(c) Secured National Highways : Manipur’s two National Highways, which connect the State to the rest of the country and are considered lifelines, have remained closed since the unrest erupted in May 2023. This has led to a surge in the prices of essential commodities (almost 100% price hike for some essential commodities vis-à-vis outside the State), with the poorest bearing the brunt.

Furthermore, transportation in and out of the valley now relies on airways, how airline operators have exploited this situation, hiking airfares by 300-400 per cent, which has adversely affected the poor, particularly patients seeking medical treatment and students studying outside the State. Thus, there is a need for safe, secured, reliable and all-weather lines of communication to Imphal, the State capital. Dedicate a sizeable element of the State forces to secure the highways.

Stringent punitive actions must be taken against personnel who indulge in blockade of highways, enact laws as non-bailable for such offences. For a long-term solution to this perpetual problem, revoke Manipur Land Revenue and Land Reforms Act 1960 and permit all indigenous commuities to settle five kilometres either side of the National Highways.

(d) Strict Enforcement of CFGR : One of the most important tasks for the Unified Command is strict implementation of CFGR rules. Punitive actions, including confiscation of weapons and munitions need to be taken when violated. Pending a final poli- tical solution, all SoO cadres with their weapons, munitions and other warlike stores must be kept in their barracks in designated camps.

(e) Political Will : Strong political will both at the State level as well as at the Centre is need of the hour. Combined with intense disarma- ment operations by the SFs, side by side dialogues without pre-conditions must be initiated by the executives. Remember conflict resolution requires political dialogue from warring factions, the agenda should be without disintegrating unity of Manipur.

The Centre must give all the support and initiate concrete steps, made aware to the public, so as to lead to conflict resolution. The influx of illegal migrants from Myanmar into the hills of Manipur has given apprehension among indigenous people in the State of marginalization and finding a permanent solution to the problem remains crucial for the sustainability of peace. Take a holistic view of the prevailing situation to articulate a comprehensive solution aimed at isolating armed miscreants through welfare activities for vulnerable populations.

(f) Reconciliation and Dialogue : In order to arrest the level of violence in the State and bring in some semblance of law and order, all the Civil Society Organisations (CSOs), student organisations and Other Key Organisations both in the valley and in the hills need to be actively engaged. Thereafter, bring in a common agenda so as to resolve the conflict by peaceful dialogue.

These arrangements must go on side-by-side with military means containment of violence under the Unified Command. Initially it can be in the form of backtrack channel dialogue to feel the pulse of the public of the two warring communities. Elected representatives, civil society groups, women’s groups, and student and youth groups initiating reconciliation between Meitei and Kuki-Zo groups can give peace a chance in troubled Manipur. Encourage communities to step out of communal comfort zones and foster coexistence.

(g) Rehabilitation of IDPs : The problem of IDPs has grown to frightening proportions solely because of the long stays from both communities in relief camps. If one considers the income loss of the IDPs alone living in the different relief camps, it comes to almost Rs 800 crore in two years. Prioritize the safe return of internally displaced persons (IDPs) to their homes and restore their livelihoods to ensure stability and normalcy.

Helping displaced villagers rebuild their lives is crucial for the restoration of peace. Special financial assistance to the affected families to resume agricultural activities, subsidizing the marketing cost, providing educational support to students, imparting skill training to youth, providing them stipends during skill training, and providing financial support to women self-help groups to undertake income-generating activities in their villages will help them realize how armed miscreants have pushed them to uncertainty by indulging in mindless violence.

(h) NRC : Ensure early implementation of NRC based on 1951 or 1961 census in Manipur.

(j) Address Regional Political Instability : Engage in proactive measures to address political situations in neighbouring countries like Myanmar and Bangladesh that impact regional security.

(k) Restoration of Rule of Law : Re-establish law and order to ensure the safety, security, and rights of all citizens. The Centre must be serious and take decisive action on wrongdoings.

Lastly, leverage Manipur’s legacy of coexistence as a political resource for unity. Make the public aware that Manipur State itself is “Unity in Diversity”, a home to 34 indigenous communities. Reject the artificial barriers/division between hill and valley regions.