Manipur’s Status During 1947-49

Dr. L. Malem Mangal *

Manipur Rajbari – Redlands – in Shillong (in 2019) :: Pix - IT News

The challenges before Manipur aimed at dismembering her integrity and continuity as a historical and political entity are endless throughout history. Colonial forces and identity politics based on ethnicity have time and again posed serious predicaments to Manipur’s existence as a civilisation. Located in the Himalayan region between South Asia and South East Asia, the region’s geo-political importance informs much of its upheavals and existential crises.

Same is true of the crises which Manipur faces at the second lap of the 21st century. Manipuri people irrespective of ethnic affiliations and aspirations have throughout history stood as one man and over-come numerous ordeals which sought to decimate our collective co-existence.

In the face of such intermittent forces, it is worthy to recall and remind ourselves of the political status of Manipur during the period from 1947 till 1949. Such retrospection will definitely help in dispelling certain agendas which are anti-thesis to the very idea of Manipur and its continuity.

PRE-1947 PERIOD

At the very outset, it must be noted that this Asian State of Manipur had existed with its own distinct history and culture for thousands of years with written historical records of her own since 33 AD. The first phase that defined the status of Manipur in international politics included the encounters which it had with the expansionist Burmese and colonial British forces.

Mention can be made of the epoch making event, the Treaty of Yandaboo, 1826 concluded between the British and Burmese Governments at the end of what the people of Manipur call as the Seven Years of Devastation (1819-1826). By the Yandaboo Treaty, both the Governments recognised the independence of Manipur and also guaranteed not to interfere into the domestic affairs of the State.

Before 1826, British and Manipur concluded the Treaty of Alliance in 1762 by which both the parties agreed to provide assistance to each other in terms of defence and military in the event of fighting with their common enemy State – Burma (now Myanmar). The next important diplomatic relation which Manipur had with the British was with respect to Jiri (now called as Jiribam).

By the Treaty of 1833, both British and Manipur Governments recognised Jiribam as the western-most boundary of the State of Manipur. It must be noted that all these treaty relationships which Manipur had entered into with the British Government was during the height of colonial era.

And as such, as history unfolded British interests towards South East Asia was sought to realise at the cost of Manipur’s freedom and by pursuing acts that constituted breaches of its commitment made in the Yandaboo Treaty of 1826.

The unwarranted interference of the British into the domestic political affairs of Manipur finally culminated into the Anglo-Manipur War of 1891 where Manipuri forces were defeated. However, British did not annex Manipur but was held as a Protectorate under the authority of the Crown till 1947.

MANIPUR’S STATUS AT THE LAPSE OF BRITISH PARAMOUNTCY

(a) MAY 12, 1946 – AUGUST 14, 1947

It must be noted that the impending lapse of British rule in the Indian sub-continent was gaining momentum since late 1930s. The experimental scheme to establish a Federation of India consisting of the British Provinces and Princely States under the Government of India Act, 1935 failed to achieve its intended purpose due to objections from the Rulers of the States.

With the changing political climate at the international front as a result of the WWII, British Parliament had initiated certain policies to study post-independent future political arrangements for the British Provinces and Princely States.

These includes
(i) statement made by His Majesty’s Government in Britain on 20th February, 1946,
(ii) the Memorandum on States’ Treaties and Paramountcy (MSTP) submitted by the Cabinet Mission to His Highness, the Chancellor of the Chamber of Princes, May 12, 1946,
(iii) Cabinet Mission Plan, May 16, 1946 (iv) statement made by British Prime Minister, Clement Atlee on June 3rd 1947 before the British Parliament and its corresponding statement made in India by Lord Mountbatten, and
(v) the Indian Independence Bill, 1947 receiving the Royal assent on July 18, 1947, etc.

All these developments cumulatively confirmed the approaching independence of British Indian Provinces and Princely States in categorical terms. It may, however, be noted that the date appointed to make British Paramountcy lapse in India was August 15, 1947.

At this historical juncture, understanding Manipur’s politico-legal status as a Princely State under the British Crown before August 15, 1947 is worth doing. It was a time of hectic nation building project launched under the leadership of Nehru, Patel, V.P. Menon, etc. Sardar Patel amongst others was particularly steadfast to make States accede or surrender to the Union of India at the lapse of British paramountcy.

The Dominion Government of India (DGI) was putting heavy pressures upon the States to enter into relationship with the Indian State in the coming. It is in such a context that on 11th August, 1947, the Constitutional Head of the State of Manipur, Maharajah Bodhchandra singed the Standstill Agreement (SA) and the Instrument of Accession (IOA).

The purpose of Standstill Agreement was to secure stability in the administrative relationship which was in existence under the British India Government consisting of the Provinces and the States. It was a measure or a scheme to maintain the status quo ante in the administrative set up.

The Instrument of Accession (IOA) represented the scheme of things which were elucidated by the Memorandum on States’ Treaties and Paramountcy concerning the status of and options available to the Princely States at the lapse of the paramount power.

The Memorandum in its Paragraph 5 provided that “[T]he void will have to be filled either by the States entering into federal relationship with the successor Government or Governments in British India, or failing this, entering into particular political arrangements with it or them”.

The IOA sought to establish a ‘federal relationship’ or ‘particular political arrangements’ between the future Government of India and Princely States. One of the best example of the federal relationship established by IOA was the relationship which the State of Jammu & Kashmir (1947-2019) had with the Union of India through Article 370 of the latter’s constitution.

The Cabinet Mission Plan had on May 12, 1946 stated that “...It is quite clear that with the attainment of independence by British India... the relationship which has hitherto existed between the Rulers of the States and the British Crown will no longer be possible...”

Paragraph 5 of the MSTP also stipulated that “...This means that the rights of the States which flow from their relationship to the Crown will no longer exist and that all the rights surrendered by the States to the Paramount Power (read British Government) will return to the States”.

The intent and objective of all these policy statements and instruments indicated that Princely States were highly encouraged or rather pressurised by the DGI to negotiate their future political status with the political entity in the coming called India. It needs to note that treaty making capacity is an attribute of state sovereignty.

And as per Section 7(1) (b) of the Indian Independence Act, British Paramountcy lapses on August 15, 1947 and as a result of that, Princely States will regain their sovereignty. Issues that arose concerning Hyderabad, Travancore, Junnagadh suggests that States were indeed coerced or threats were deployed to make them agree acceding to Indian Union.

However, as Princely States concluded agreements such as the Standstill Agreement and put signature to the Instrument of Accession with the Dominion Government of India establishing federal relationship with the Indian State, one could notice that these Princely States were in fact exercising their treaty making power at a time when British Paramountcy was yet to lapse.

This seems to be a sui generis case given the unfolding political developments around the lapse of British paramountcy. The policy statements and instruments mentioned in the preceding paragraphs went on to clothe the States with treaty making capacity. Moreover, the Indian Independence Bill received the Royal assent on July 18, 1947.

Under the British Parliamentary law-making system, a Bill become an Act acquiring the force of law on the date which it receives the assent of the Head of the State. Thus, we can say that the status of Princely States including Manipur during May 12, 1946 to August 14, 1947 were in the nature of semi-sovereign entities clothed with the capacities to enter into diplomatic or treaty relationships especially with either the Dominion Government of India or Dominion Government of Pakistan as purported to be established under the Indian Independence Bill, 1947.

Under the scheme of things under the Indian Independence Bill and the developments which followed the Cabinet Mission Plan, Manipur had a status of a semi-sovereign statehood clothed with treaty making capacities.

(b) AUGUST 15, 1947 – OCTOBER 15, 1949

As per Section 7(1) (b) of the IIA, at the lapse of British Paramountcy on and from August 15, 1947, Manipur among other Princely States became a fully sovereign independent State, her lost sovereignty having been restored. This status has been upheld and reaffirmed by the Supreme Court of India in various decisions from 1954 till 1993 (Virendra Singh v. State of UP, 1954 AIR 447; The States of Saurashtra v. Memom Haji Ismai, 1959 AIR 1383; Sawwarlal v. States of Hyderabad, 1960 AIR 862; State of Gujarat v. Vora Fiddali, 1964 AIR 1043; Shri Ragunathrao Ganpathrao v. Union of India, 1993 AIR 1267).

To negate such a position would tantamount to rendering all the agreements which were concluded between the Government of India and States untenable. The implication would be that the idea of “independent India” would comprise of only the territories known as British Indian Provinces excluding the States.

The State transitioned from a Monarchy towards a Constitutional Democracy with the adoption of the Manipur State Constitution Act, 1947 on 26th July, 1947 and holding of elections based on adult franchise from June to July, 1948. A 53 seat Parliament was established making Manipur one of the first States in Asia to have ushered into a Parliamentary Democracy.

The 53 seats were divided into General, Tribals and Mohammedan constituencies having 30, 18 and 3 seats respectively. While M.K. Priyobarta was the first Chief Minister, Mr. T.C. Tiankham became the first Speaker of the Manipur Parliament.

However, Manipur’s recently restored sovereignty and democratically established institutions – namely the Government of Manipur and Parliament of Manipur were nipped in the bud when the Dominion Government of India forcibly occupied Manipur on October 15, 1949 through an order known as the Manipur Administration Order (MAO) subsequent to the Merger Agreement. The circumstances under which the Merger Agreement (MA) was made to sign by the titular King Bodhchandra and why the agreement is considered as null and void without any legal consequences is worth discussing.

MERGER AGREEMENT OF 21ST SEPTEMBER, 1949

It must be recalled that Maharajah Bodhchandra and his team were detained at the Redlands, Shillong under the colonial Bengal Regulation III, 1818 (Regulation III) which allowed detention of persons as under the National Security Act, 1980 of present day India. His team was not allowed to consult with his Council of Ministers.

On 21st September 1949, Maharajah Bodhchandra signed the Merger Agreement with V.P. Menon, representative of the Dominion Government of India in the presence of Shri Prakasa, Governor of Assam under duress. The state of detention and seizure of the then titular King Bodhchandra could be well observed from the following statements made in a letter sent by Shri Prakasa, Governor of Assam to Sardar Patel, Deputy Prime Minister of India through telegram on 18th September, 1949:

“"... Had discussions with His Highness of Manipur this morning. HH must not under any circumstances be allowed to return to Manipur with his advisors and I have accordingly instructed police to detain here his party if they attempt to return before signing of agreement (sic. 1949 Merger Agreement).

Please telegraph immediately repeat immediately authority for detention of HH and advisors under Regulation III (sic. abduction and kidnapping of the king by foreign Indian security forces) or by whatever other means you consider might be appropriate.

Have already warned sub-area to be prepared for any eventuality (sic. covert military aggression and coup) in Manipur. Grateful for further instructions..."

In return, Sardar Patel from Birla House, Bombay is reported to have asked Prakasa thus: “...Is there no Indian Brigadier (at Shillong)?

The Shillong Times dated 27th September, 1949 report titled “Manipur annexed by New Delhi” also corroborates the position. Thus, from the historical records, it is clear that armed and military activities of the Dominion Government of India and its agencies in Redlands, Shillong and Manipur and areas surrounding the State exerted sufficient threats coercing Manipur’s titular King to sign the Merger Agreement.

Now, the issue of legality of the Merger Agreement attracts both Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 1969 and Manipur State Constitution Act, 1947. So far as the Instrument of Accession, 1947 sought to accede only three subjects to the Government of India namely – defence, external affairs and communication, it was less serious in nature than the Merger Agreement by which the authority to administer the whole of the State of Manipur was transferred to the Indian Government.

Under the IOA, Government of India did not have any jurisdiction save the three subjects. The acceding States did not lose their sovereignty nor were bound by the terms of the accession in perpetuity. It was an instrument or treaty that sought to establish federal relationship between Princely States and the Union of India.

However, the Merger Agreement as we have seen is a treaty of the most serious nature and consequence because it gave the Dominion Government of India the full and exclusive authority, powers and jurisdiction to take over the governance of the State of Manipur and transferred the right and authority to administer Manipur to the Dominion Government of India. This is the difference between the two instruments as also with their implications.

CAPACITY OR COMPETENCE OF MANIPUR’S TITULAR KING TO CONCLUDE OR ACCEDE TO TREATIES

Discussing the capacity or competence of the person who signed an agreement is crucial to understand its legality or vice-versa. Let us first state the legal capacity and position of Maharajah Bodhchandra under the scheme of things as per the Manipur State Constitution Act, 1947 (MSCA). Section 9 (b) of MSCA stated that the Maharajah was the constitutional Head of the State of Manipur.

Section 8 (a) limits the prerogatives of the Maharajah to any matter wherein the legitimate interests of the State Administration was involved. The Executive Authority was not vested into the hands of the Maharajah since Section 10 (a) vested it in the Council of Ministers.

Law making authority was conferred upon the Maharajah in Council in collaboration with the State Assembly acting under Section 18 which says that the State Assembly shall debate all matters concerning the Government and well-being of the State and thereby tender advice to the Council of Ministers which must be supported by 40 members vote out of a total 53. Thus under the MSCA, the Maharajah did not posses capacity to conclude or acceded to treaties with the Dominion Government of India or for that matter with any other legal person.

Second, the principles of treaty making process as embodied in the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 1969 (VCLT) comes into picture here. The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, also known as treaty on treaties is an international treaty per se that has codified the customary norms regulating treaty making processes.

Thus applying the circumstances under which Manipur’s titular king was coerced to sign the Merger Agreement as described in the foregoing paragraphs within the framework of the law of treaties, we can see the interpretation and readings. Article 51 of VCLT states that use of threats or coercion to procure consent of a State representative to sign a treaty is without any legal effect.

Article 52 continues to stipulate that a treaty is void if its conclusion has been procured by the threat or use of force in violation of the principles of international law embodied in the Charter of the United Nations. Detention of the Maharajah under Regulation III, the use of threats or force against him and not allowing him to consult with his Council of Ministers attracts Articles 51 and 52 of the VCLT. Hence, the Merger Agreement is without any legal consequence.

For any treaty concluded to have legal effect, it must be ratified by the Legislature of the signatory State. Article 14 (1) (c) and (d) of VCLT provides this requirement. The fact that Manipur Parliament had never ratified the agreement proves this deficiency. This is equally true of the Instrument of Accession thus rendering it without any legality.

It can be noted that the Instrument of Accession signed by the ruler of the Princely State of Jammu and Kashmir on 26th October 1947 was accepted by Lord Mountbatten the next day that is 27th October, 1947. Jammu & Kashmir Assembly voted to ratify accession to India on 6th February, 1954.

Further, the relationship that was established between the State of Jammu & Kashmir and the Dominion Government of India through the IOA was constitutionally acknowledged by way of Article 370 until 2019. The territorial integrity of the State of Jammu & Kashmir was also guaranteed by an Order issued by the President of India on 14th May, 1954.

However in the case of Manipur with respect to the IOA and the Merger Agreement, there had been neither such reciprocal acknowledgments nor ratification from either side. Contradistinctively the Manipur Parliament in a session held on 28th September, 1949 denounced Merger Agreement as illegal and unconstitutional and without any legal consequences to the State of Manipur.

We also recall that the whole of people of Manipur had renounced the Merger Agreement and annexation of Manipur as illegal and unconstitutional by the National Convention on Manipur Merger issue dated 28-29 October, 1993.

Thus Manipur’s politico-legal status varied from time and space. However, from the standards of international law Manipur’s situation after October 15, 1949 resemble to that of the illegally occupied Palestinian Territories with India assuming the role of an administering State. Legitimacy of India’s administration of Manipur since 1949 is an area of further research.