Indo-Naga Second Ceasefire, 1997 : An analysis
- Part 1 -
Dr Gairiangmei Maringmei *
Thuingaleng Muivah and Isaac Swu : Indo-Naga Talks
This paper is an attempt to analyze the progresses and developments of the Indo-Naga Second Ceasefire Agreement of 1997. The beginning of the Indo-Naga peace talks seemed to be promising as the people of Northeast people in general and Nagas particularly longing for peace in the Northeastern region for decades. But today, it appears that the peace process is less of ups and more of downs in the political negotiations. More than 80 rounds of talks held till date, but so far no substantial progress is visible.
In late 1980s, the Government of India (GoI) seemed to have realized that Indo-Naga conflict is not a law and order problem but a political issue so the GoI tried to solve through political means. The Indian leaders have been made several attempts to reach out to make a deal with the National Socialist Council of Nagaland (NSCN) for negotiation even before its split into two factions: National Socialist Council of Nagaland (NSCN-IM) and (NSCN-K) in 1988.
Subir Bhaumik, BBC correspondent, stated that "Rajiv Gandhi, Prime Minister of India appointed N F Suntook in 1985 to contact the NSCN for ceasefire and political dialogue, but for some reasons the attempt could not materialize". The GoI sent its feelers to the NSCN (IM) leadership for negotiation to settle the political issue through peaceful means, the latter accepted the invitation and held series of dialogues between the GoI and NSCN (IM) in mid-1990s.
Many leaders of India including the Prime Ministers of India, Narashimha Rao, Deve Gowda, and I K Gujral had engaged in peace talks with the NSCN (IM) leaders in various third world countries like Paris, France, New York, USA, Bangkok, Thailand, Zurich, Germany, Geneva etc. As a result of these meetings, on 25 July, 1997, the Ceasefire Agreement was signed between the GoI and NSCN (IM) for a three-month with effect from 1st August, 1997. The Ceasefire Agreement also read out by the then Prime Minister of India, I K Gujral in Parliament of India on 25th July, 1997. It was mutually agreed upon between the two entities: the GoI and NSCN (IM) that during the period of Ceasefire:
a) There would be no offensive operations like ambush, raid and attack leading to death/injury/damage or loss of property against the NSCN by the Indian Army, Paramilitary Forces and the Police.
b) Patrolling by the Indian Army, Paramilitary forces and the Police would continue to prevent infiltration of militants and arms as hitherto fore. However, patrolling within one kilometer of NSCN designated camps, decided after due consultation in the Monitoring mechanism, will be carried out with intimation to them. It is noted that no such camps are located/will be located in urban areas, and/or near highways.
c) Protection of convoys and patrolling of roads would continue to be undertaken by the Indian Army, Paramilitary-Forces and the Police.
d) The Indian Army, Paramilitary Forces and the Police would issue instructions to their formations not to use masks to cover their faces during the period of Cease-fire.
e) The NSCN would not undertake offensive operations like ambush, raid, sniping and attack leading to death/injury/damage or loss of property.
f) In the interest of promoting peace process, there would be no parading (either in groups or individually) of NSCN cadres in uniform and/or with arms, For the present, this would cover towns including District Headquarters, Sub-Divisional Headquarters, Public Transport, Highways and such EAC Headquarters and other areas as may be mutually agreed upon by the Joint Monitoring mechanism.
g) There would be no blockade of roads and communications, disruption of economic or developmental activities as well as essential services by the NSCN. It is mutually agreed that no safe haven or sanctuary to any armed group or elements will be provided by anyone to ensure that the Cease-fire conditions were not misutilise.
h) On the Government of India side, a concern was expressed that forcible collection of money or essential supplies and intimidation of individuals including Government officials were taking place in the state. The NSCN representatives stated that theirs being a people's organization, they did not resort to such activities. However, in view of the concern expressed by the Government of India and in the interest of promoting the peace process, the NSCN representatives agreed that the above activities would be prevented.
i) It was further agreed that implementation of these ground rules and modalities will be monitored by a group constituted for this purpose comprising of representatives of NSCN, NGO's and representatives nominated by the Government of India. However, it was also agreed that any accidental encounter or violation should not be allowed to jeopardize the peace process and the effect of any such incident should be localized through mutual consultations. All cases of violation of these ground rules would be referred to the Monitoring group, so that the reasons for violation are identified and steps to be taken to prevent such violations in further are suggested. Notwithstanding the above, the Army, Paramilitary Forces and the Police will act in an impartial and unbiased manner against any group causing public disturbance or when there is imminent danger to public safety or peace.
j) On the Government of India side, a concern was expressed about reports of forced recruitment to armed cadres. The NSCN representatives stated that they have not and do not resort to forced recruitment. However, in the interest of promoting the peace process, it was agreed that if there are any reports of forced recruitment, they should be discussed in the Monitoring group.
k) Under the conducive atmosphere being brought about by the declaration of the Ceasefire, the Political Talks between the two entities started, based on the following three conditions:
(i) Without any condition;
(ii) At the Prime Minister's level; and
(iii) In a third country.
The Ceasefire Monitoring Group (CMG or CFMG) was constituted and the members are from the India's security forces, intelligence agencies, officials and members of the NSCN (IM). The function of the CMG is to oversee and guide the efficient functioning of the agreed ceasefire ground rules.
From different walks of life across the globe, irrespective of political affiliations, welcome the Ceasefire Agreement as the first step of confidence building measures towards the lasting final settlement to the decades-old Indo-Naga conflicts. The main objective of the Ceasefire Agreement is to facilitate for peaceful political negotiations between the GoI and Nagas and to bring about a lasting political solution.
It is worthwhile to mention that the Ceasefire Agreement of 1997 limited only to one group i. e., NSCN (IM) out of many groups. This agreement has excluded the NSCN (K), Naga National Council (NNC)-Federal, and others which show biasness in the spirit of the agreement. However after a period of three years, another ceasefire was signed between the GoI and NSCN (K), again leaving the NNC-F. The operational definition of group rules between the GoI and NSCN (K) is seen only in the state of Nagaland, which has a narrower scope.
Meanwhile, the NNC-F has also demanded to renew the First Ceasefire of 1964, which covers all the Nagas inhabited areas. NNC-F criticized the ongoing ceasefire, terming it as "piecemeal solution".
They have insisted upon the GoI to open the chapter that was kept in abeyance since 1967 in the level of Prime Minister of India, Smt. Indira Gandhi.
Several rounds of talks were held in many third world countries. As soon as the National Democratic Alliance (NDA) led Bharatya Janata Party (BJP) came to power at the Centre, Atal Behari Vajpai, the then Prime Minister of India appointed Swaraj Kaushal, former Governor of Mizoram and a senior Supreme Court lawyer as interlocutor of GoI. Another round of peace talks was held in Amsterdam with full knowledge and permission of the Netherland's Government led by Swaraj Kaushal and NSCN (IM) leaders on 18 September, 1998, later the then Prime Minister, Atal Behari Vajpai met NSCN (IM) leaders on 30 September, 1998 in Paris.
Swaraj Kaushal was asked to resign as the interlocutor by the then Prime Minister of India, Atal Behari Vajpai, a few days earlier after the former allegedly gave "concession" to the NSCN (IM). Kaushal views on the scope of the ceasefire were also unequivocal, as articulated in a 1998 statement: conducive "Wherever they (NSCN) are, we observe ceasefire, even abroad... Yes, very definitely. It covers Delhi and even Paris... After all, it is not that they will be killing each other in a particular area and discussing peace in another area. What is required conducive atmosphere for a discussion..."
He appeared to have handed the three worded phrase "without territorial limits" on a platter to NSCN (IM). He defended his decision by saying that Vajpayee had agreed to a ceasefire without territorial limits but "back tracked" his statement later. Subsequently, Kaushal was replaced by K Padmanabhaiah, the former Home Secretary, GoI.
Padmanabhaiah as a primary interlocutor met NSCN (IM) leaders in Bangkok for the first round of talks, there NSCN (IM) leaders expressed unhappiness over the tardy progress in the political dialogues. NSCN (IM) leaders stuck to the demand for a "Sovereign Nagaland" comprising of all Naga-inhabited areas of Assam and Manipur and Arunachal Pradesh, besides the Nagaland State. Nothing concrete had emerged out of these meetings.
The ceasefire process suffered a major setback with the arrest of Thuingaleng Muivah, the General Secretary of NSCN (IM) in Bangkok on 19 January, 2000. As a result, the peace talks had come to a halt for one year. While the NSCN (IM) leaders demanded that the GoI should pressurize the Government of Thailand for Muivah's early release, but the GoI had refused to interfere in the legal processes of another country. Later, Muivah was released on the ground that he was a key negotiator in the peace process.
To be continued...
* Dr Gairiangmei Maringmei wrote this article for The Sangai Express
The writer is a research scholar and can be contacted at gairiangmei(at)gmail(dot)com
This article was posted on July 10, 2014.
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