In search of an out of the box model : Approach to insurgency
- The Sangai Express Editorial :: December 08 2011 -

It is an issue which cannot be simply wished away and any attempt to study the political, social and economic scenario of the North East region, particularly a State like Manipur can never be complete without referring to it.

If 'the long hand of the law' says something about how the law ultimately catches up with even the most slippery customer, the impact of insurgency may also be understood in the context of its effect on the overall life of the people of Manipur and herein lies the interesting question of the political initiatives taken up to address this long standing issue, that dates back decades.

It was in recognition of the deep impact of armed militancy that the Centre invoked the Armed Forces Special Powers Act in the whole of Manipur in 1980.

It is in line with the invocation of this Act that Delhi has spared no expenses in deploying its troops in the State and a conservative estimate will put the strength of the Army and the para-military force anywhere near the 50,000 mark, give a few thousands more.

It is in line with this issue that police modernisation has come to spawn a new understanding of how the State police force should be trained and equipped to take on the might of the numerous armed groups operating in the State.

Again it is in recognition of this situation that each and every political leader from Delhi has been stressing on the indispensable need of the rebel groups to come to the negotiating table and thrash out the issues through political dialogue.

That a political dialogue is the only answer to the armed movement in the region and the State of Manipur is a given and it is in keeping with this train of thought that Delhi today finds itself engaged in dialogues with numerous armed outfits from the North East region.

The Mizoram Accord of 1986 inked between the then Congress Government at New Delhi under Rajiv Gandhi and the Mizo National Front under Laldenga today stands as the testimony of what political dialogue can do what the military strength of either the Government of India and the armed militants or the language of the guns cannot do.

Whether the Mizoram Accord served as the model or not, a whole lot of armed groups active and operating in the North East region are today engaged in a political dialogue with the Centre. The Achik National Volunteer Council of Meghalaya, the National Democratic Front of Bodoland (Pro), the two factions of the Dima Holam Daogah, ULFA (led by Arabinda Rajkhowa) and the two factions of the NSCN are today engaged in political dialogues with Delhi, officially bidding farewell to arms and the bush war.

First Mizoram, then Nagaland, Meghalaya and now Assam and truly Delhi must be having its plate full of political negotiations with different armed groups from the North East.

Save for the groups which have inked the Suspension of Operation agreement with the Government, Manipur stands as the lone exception.

Not a single major outfit from Manipur have come to the negotiating table to thrash out a political settlement to the issues that besiege the State. While the United National Liberation Front has more than spelt out its Plebiscite stand in no uncertain terms, other outfits including the Revolutionary People's Front has made it clear that it would not go in for a political dialogue.

If this is the stand of the two major outfits, the fact that none of the other members of the CorCom (an umbrella body formed not too long back and comprising besides the two, PREPAK, PREPAK (Pro), KYKL, KCP and UPPK) have come forward for a political dialogue says something very significant.

This is the situation and the response of the political leadership (understood not only as the elected representatives of the people but also those who have taken part in the process as candidates) to the situation that insurgency has spawned has always remained only at the stage of issuing calls for a negotiated settlement.

This is also the line that the Delhi mandarins have been parroting all these years and the very fact that no worthwhile response from the armed groups has been forthcoming should be enough indication that the time has come for some out of the box approach and thinking.

The question is where insurgency and the issues that it straddles figure on the agenda of the political parties gearing up for the forthcoming election. Former Governor Dr SS Sidhu's 'dissatisfied brethren' call in the Republic Day speech of 2005 received the Plebiscite response from the UNLF.

This was an out of the box approach and it says something about the political leadership of Manipur that they miserably failed to take forward from this response.

Rewind to 2001 when Radhabinod Koijam, during his two months stint as the Chief Minister, came out with the 30 days unilateral ceasefire from the side of the State Government. This was another out of the box approach.

These are the only two instances which may be cited as some novel initiatives to tackle the issue of insurgency in the State and the fact that these have not been capitalised upon says something about what keeps the political leadership of the day ticking.

Early next year Manipur will go to polls and perhaps it is the right time to start raising the insurgency question on the intending candidates as well as all the political parties.

Or is insurgency important only in the context of police modernisation and for the Armed Forces Special Powers Act to continue ?